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Abstract
A pervasive interpretation among Husserl scholars is that his transcendental idealism
inevitably leads to some form of solipsism. The aim of this dissertation is to defend Husserl
against this charge. First, I argue that Husserl’s transcendental idealism is not a metaphysical
theory.

Transcendental phenomenology brackets all metaphysical presuppositions and

argues from experience to the conditions of the possibility of experience.

Husserl’s

transcendental idealism should therefore be interpreted as a transcendental theory of
knowledge. Second, it follows from the above characterization of Husserl’s transcendental
idealism that the responses Husserl gives to the problem of solipsism are in no way meant to
prove the existence in-itself of an external world or the existence in-themselves of other
transcendental egos. The purpose of Husserl’s engagement with the problem of solipsism is
to explain how it is that transcendental phenomenology can account for the constitution of
both the Objectivity of the world of experience and other psycho-physical subjects. The
result is a set of transcendental arguments that explain the necessary conditions of the
cognition of a shared external world and of other persons. I conclude with Husserl that the
solipsism is a transcendental illusion, and that Husserl’s transcendental idealism does not
lead to a problematic solipsism.

Through a careful study of Husserl’s Nachlass, with

particular attention paid to Ideas I, Formal and Transcendental Logic, and Cartesian
Meditations, I lay the framework for a transcendental-epistemological interpretation of
Husserl’s idealism.

Applying this interpretive strategy to Husserl’s discussions of the

problem of solipsism and intersubjective monadology, I argue that, for Husserl, empathy is
the condition of the experience of other subjects, but that it does not allow us to experience
the mental-lives of other transcendental egos.
Keywords
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Introduction
“…the whole spatiotemporal world, which includes human being and the human Ego as subordinate single
realities is, according to its sense, a merely intentional being, thus one that has the merely secondary sense of
being for a consciousness…[and] beyond that it is nothing.”
Husserl, Ideas I, p.112 <93>

“Whatever I encounter as an existing object is something that…has received its whole being-sense for me from
my effective intentionality; not a shadow of that sense remains excluded from my effective intentionality.
Precisely this I must consult, I must explicate systematically, if I intend to understand that sense and
consequently to understand also what I am allowed, and what I am not allowed, to attribute to an object.”
Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, p.234 <207>

A typical undergraduate introduction to the work of Edmund Husserl will make little or no
mention of his commitment to transcendental philosophy. There is good reason for this.
First, casting Husserl’s thought in these terms requires some background knowledge of Kant
and Fichte, who themselves are not easily understood.

Second, history shows us that

Husserl’s lasting contribution to philosophy was phenomenology, but not his transcendental
idealism. Third, even experts on Husserl find aspects of his transcendental phenomenology
difficult to understand. The resulting caricature of Husserl is one of a philosopher whose
work consists primarily in detailed descriptive analyses of phenomena as they are
experienced by a subject, where such descriptions are guided by a methodological constraint
known as “bracketing.” This is certainly where Husserl’s phenomenology begins, but this is
far from its end.
Whereas beginners in philosophy are, by and large, kept in the dark with respect to
Husserl’s transcendental philosophy, deciphering this aspect of Husserl’s thought is one of
the greatest challenges faced by Husserl scholars, and one which they cannot overlook. In
the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl writes that, carried out systematically, “phenomenology

1

is eo ipso ‘transcendental idealism’, though in a fundamentally and essentially new sense.” 1
He insists that only someone who “misunderstands either the deepest sense of intentional
method, or that of transcendental reduction, or perhaps both, can attempt to separate
phenomenology from transcendental idealism.” 2

Husserl committed himself to

transcendental idealism sometime between 1905 and 1908. From this point onward he often
referred to his phenomenology as pure or transcendental phenomenology, and characterized
it as a transcendental theory of knowledge and as a transcendental monadology.
In the ‘Introduction’ to Husserliana XXXVI: Transzendentaler Idealismus. Texts aus
dem Nachlass (1908-1921), Rochus Sowa writes that Husserl’s special sense of
transcendental idealism can be summarized as the thesis that, “the existence of real objects,
and thus the existence of the real world, is unthinkable without reference to a consciousness
which is currently experiencing them.” 3 Those objects that in the natural attitude we refer to
as “real” are simply objects which consciousness constitutes with a particular kind of beingsense [Seinssinn], and that nothing exists for me - not myself, my body, the world, nor others
- apart from my being conscious of it.

While the phenomenology of his Logical

Investigations had attracted positive attention from the philosophical community, these later
transcendental writings were met with overwhelming resistance, especially from Husserl’s
students and fellow phenomenologists. A common complaint, which Husserl considered to
be “truly disturbing,” 4 was that his transcendental phenomenology not only leads to

1

Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p.86 <118>
Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p.86 <119>
3
„Sie besagt, dass die Existenz von realen Gegenständen und damit die Existenz der realen Welt nicht denkbar
ist ohne Bezug auf ein aktuell erfahrendes Bewusstsein.“ (Husserl, Hua XXXVI, p.ix) This is the dominant
interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental idealism. For instance, Roman Ingarden considered the fundamental
thesis of Husserl’s transcendental idealism to be that what is real is “nothing but a constituted noematic unity
(individual) of a special kind of sense which in its manner of being (Sosein) results from a set of experiences of
a special kind and is quite impossible without them. Entities of this kind exist only for the pure transcendental
ego which experiences such a set of perceptions. The existence of what is perceived (of the perceived as such)
is nothing ‘in itself’ (an sich) but only something ‘for somebody,’ for the experiencing ego.” (Roman Ingarden,
On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism, p.21. Translation modified.) According to
James Mensch, Husserl’s transcendental idealism would have it that “being depends upon knowing or – to
speak more precisely – that an object’s being depends upon its being-given to consciousness.” (James Mensch,
Intersubjectivity and Transcendental Idealism, p.3) Similarly, Sebastian Luft argues that the central claim of
Husserl’s transcendental idealism is “that all being receives its meaning in meaning-bestowing acts of
transcendental subjectivity.” (Sebastian Luft, “From Being to Givenness and Back: Some Remarks on the
Meaning of Transcendental Idealism in Kant and Husserl,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15:3
(2007), p.368)
4
Husserl, The Paris Lectures, p.34 <34>
2
2

solipsism, but that it starts from solipsism and cannot move beyond this starting point, and
should therefore be rejected.
Husserl’s critics argued that unless transcendental phenomenology can demonstrate
the existence in-itself of the external world or the existence in-themselves of other subjects,
then it leads to solipsism. Given that Husserl acknowledged the problem of solipsism as a
threat to his theory, they interpret Husserl’s argument regarding the existence of the
Objective world, intersubjectivity, and other subjects in his later works as attempts to show
the existence of things-in-themselves.

They then conclude that Husserl’s attempts to

demonstrate the existence of the world and others are insufficient insofar as they rely on the
presupposition of an unacknowledged Leibnizian metaphysics. Husserl’s position therefore
shows itself to be a pluralistic solipsism, but solipsism nonetheless. The purpose of this
dissertation is to show that neither of these two claims is true. Husserl never attempts to
demonstrate the existence of the external world or other subjects, nor does he need to.
According to Husserl, solipsism is just as nonsensical as both realism and idealism. As Dan
Zahavi notes, “Far from entailing a commitment to a methodological or metaphysical
solipsism, Husserl’s transcendental idealism is committed to the view that the world is
necessarily correlated to an intersubjective community of embodied subjects.

His

transcendental idealism doesn’t deny the existence of mind-independent objects in the
uncontroversial sense of empirical realism, but only in the controversial sense of
metaphysical realism.” 5
The challenge for transcendental phenomenology is not to prove the existence of
things-in-themselves, but to provide transcendental arguments for how we constitute the
actual Objective external world and actual other subjects, and for how it is that consciousness
constitutes objects as having the being-sense that they have for me.

The literature on

Husserl’s use of transcendental arguments is thin and generally dismissive. While I argue
throughout this dissertation that Husserl attempts to give a transcendental argument against
solipsism, David Carr suggests in Interpreting Husserl that no such argument actually
emerges in this context, despite Husserl’s recognition that one is necessary. 6 Steven Gault

5
6

Dan Zahavi, “Internalism, externalism, and transcendental idealism,” Synthese 160 (2008), p.372
David Carr, Interpreting Husserl, p.33-34
3

Crowell suggests that Husserl never gives transcendental arguments as such, and where they
do appear to crop up, Husserl does not intend them to be taken in the sense that Kant did. 7
On my reading of Husserl’s transcendental idealism, one of the main goals of Husserlian
phenomenology is to give transcendental arguments. The difficulty, particularly in the cases
of Objectivity, intersubjectivity, and empathy, is figuring out how Husserl intends for these
arguments to work.
The basic transcendental argument, or rather, the set of nested transcendental
arguments, that I understand Husserl to be giving in response to the problem of solipsism
runs as follows: Possible other subjects are a necessary condition of the constitution of a
world of the Non-ego. Actual other subjects are a necessary condition of the constitution of
an Objective world. And finally, empathy is a necessary condition of the constitution of
other subjects. For Husserl, there is no sense to the claim that other subjects exist inthemselves or that an external world exists in-itself. However, if Husserl’s transcendental
arguments regarding Objectivity, intersubjectivity, and other subjects are valid, then
transcendental-phenomenological idealism does not lead to solipsism in any traditional or
problematic sense. What is more, these arguments do not rely on a Leibnizian metaphysics.
The fundamental thesis of Husserl’s transcendental idealism is best summarized as the claim
that all being is nothing other than the constitutional achievement of intentional
consciousness. Accordingly, there are no things-in-themselves, only actual and potential
objects for a cognizing subject. Everything that exists for me receives its entire being-sense
from my constituting consciousness, and beyond that they are nothing. Following Husserl,
the proof of transcendental idealism is transcendental phenomenology, defined as the study
of all possible objects and modes of cognition, or the conditions of the possibility of
cognition in general and as such. It is the science of how objects are necessarily constituted
by consciousness, whose method consists in systematic self-explication on the part of
transcendental subjectivity. 8

Such a philosophy is not a metaphysical theory, but a

transcendental-epistemological one.

7

Crowell, “Husserl, Heidegger, and Transcendental Philosophy: Another Look at the Encyclopaedia Britannica
Article,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50:3 (1990), p.507-508
8
For the most part, this characterization of Husserl’s transcendental idealism unwittingly squares with one we
find in the Sixth Cartesian Meditation. In the final section of that work, Eugen Fink explains that: “The basic
central thought of transcendental idealism is: being is in principle constituted in the life of transcendental
4

The first essay in this collection, “The ‘Metaphysical conclusions’ of Husserl’s
Monadology,” deals primarily with Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations. In the infamous ‘Fifth
Meditation’ Husserl presents his transcendental theory of empathy, which he frames as a
protracted response to the problem of solipsism.

Husserl concludes his transcendental

explication of the experience of someone else with what he refers to as a set of “metaphysical
results.” However, Husserl notes that these results are not metaphysical in any customary
sense, and are actually concerned with the cognition of being. 9 Commentators such as
Arthur David Smith seem to ignore this rather important qualification, and read Husserl as
concluding that other subjects necessarily exist in-themselves, and that there is a single
Objective mind-independent real world. 10

Contrary to Smith, I argue that the ‘Fifth

Meditation’ can only be understood if it is interpreted as a transcendental-epistemological
investigation concerned with the conditions of the possibility of cognition of the world and of
others, but not with being in-itself.

On my reading, Husserl’s monadology neither

presupposes nor defends Leibnizian metaphysics. However, it agrees with Aron Gurwitsch’s
thesis that Husserl belongs to a tradition of philosophy that also includes Leibniz and Kant.
This discussion of the Cartesian Meditations is not so much concerned with defending the
details of Husserl’s analysis, but more with outlining a correct strategy for attempting to
interpret them in light of his transcendental idealism.
The second essay, “The World ‘for me’ and the World ‘for everyone’,” is a detailed
reading of §§ 94-96 of Husserl’s Formal and Transcendental Logic. While the Formal and
Transcendental Logic remains an underutilized text for interpreting Husserl’s other later
works, it contains an important discussion of solipsism, which Husserl refers to as a

subjectivity…Transcendental idealism is best characterized by the designation “constitutive idealism.”…This
means above all that transcendental idealism is not a hypothesis resting on arguments but is the summation of
the concrete results of phenomenological analysis.” (Eugen Fink, Sixth Cartesian Meditation, p.158-159 <178>.
Translation modified.) As a science that collapses the subject-object distinction that forms the basic
problematic of traditional realism and idealism, and that instead investigates transcendental subjectivity, arguing
from experience to the conditions of the possibility of experience, “transcendental idealism is beyond idealism
and realism.” (Fink, Sixth Cartesian Meditation, p.159 <179>)
9
Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p.139-141 <166-168>
10
A.D. Smith, Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations, p.234-235
5

“transcendental illusion.” 11 Husserl argues in this text that the Objective world is inherently
intersubjective, that is, that objects which I constitute as “real” things in the world are
necessarily possible objects of cognition for other subjects like myself. It would seem to
follow from this that insofar as I actually experience an Objective world that I co-constitute
with other subjects, other subjects must exist in-themselves. However, Husserl also claims
that everything that I experience receives its entire being-sense from my effective
intentionality, including other egos. 12 If this is correct, then Husserl’s position seems to
amount to solipsism, and the denial of the existence of genuine other subjects and an
Objective external world. In this essay, I defend Husserl’s claim that this final inference is a
transcendental illusion. While it is true that the Objective world is constituted as inherently
intersubjective, and that the experience of the actual world requires the actual existence of
other cognizing subjects, none of this requires or demonstrates the existence in-themselves of
other subjects. All that is required is that Husserl needs to give an account of how we
constitute actual other subjects in experience. This appears to entail solipsism, but as long as
Husserl is able to account for both the Objective world and other subjects, then it is not
solipsism at all. It is simply a denial that objects exist in-themselves, since such existence is
nothing for me. 13
Finally, in “Husserl’s Phenomenological Idealism and its Early Critics,” I discuss
Ideas I and how this work was interpreted by Carl Stumpf and Theodor Celms. Stumpf
claimed that transcendental phenomenology is a phenomenology without phenomena, and
that Husserl fails to provide any convincing concrete results in support of his theory. I argue
that this reading misunderstands the aims of transcendental philosophy, and that Stumpf’s
criticisms are based on his adherence to metaphysical realism. Celms argues that Husserl’s

11

Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, p.241 <213>
Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, p.237 <210>
13
As Dermot Moran writes: “Husserl offers a demythologized version of transcendental idealism: there is no
such thing as the ‘thing in itself’; all being and objectivity must be understood as the product of subjective
accomplishments, and cannot be thought without them. As he put it in 1908, ‘Transcendental phenomenology
is the phenomenology of constituting consciousness’ (24:425).” (Moran, Edmund Husserl: Founder of
Phenomenology, p.6.) Later on in Moran’s book, he again argues: ““Husserl understood transcendental
idealism to mean that there is no such thing as ‘being-in-itself’ or ‘objectivity as such’; every form of
objectivity, the constitution of everything, from the natural world to the world of spirit, culture and history is
constituted, is given its ‘being and meaning’ (Sein und Sinn) by a constituting subjectivity or subjectivities
acting in consort. Furthermore, he always insists that his transcendental idealism is not in any sense solipsism,
despite his beginning from the single meditating self, the solus ipse. In fact, he regarded ‘solipsism’ as a
transcendental illusion.” (Moran, Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology, p.56-57)
6
12

phenomenological idealism can only escape solipsism with the help of the doctrine of preestablished harmony among monads, and even then, Husserl is left with a pluralistic
solipsism.14 I show that the notion that Husserl’s transcendental idealism might lead to a
pluralistic solipsism is unproblematic.

Husserl’s theory of empathy allows for the

constitution of other subjects, but it does not entail some sort of special epistemic access to
the concrete contents of other minds, nor should it. We do not directly experience the
mental-lives of others.

For Husserl, empathy is the condition of the possibility of

experiencing another subject, but empathy does not allow us first person access to their
mental-lives. More importantly, Husserl does not need to prove the existence in-themselves
of other subjects. Such metaphysical adventures are beyond the scope of transcendental
phenomenology, and therefore beyond the legitimate scope of philosophy as a rigorous
science.
In dealing with Husserl’s transcendental idealism and his engagement with the
problem of solipsism, I have tried, as far as possible, to situate Husserl within the proper
historical context. As Husserl wrote late in his life:
we must engross ourselves in historical considerations if we are to be able to
understand ourselves as philosophers and understand what philosophy is to
become through us...Every philosopher ‘takes something from the history’ of
past philosophers, from past philosophical writings - just as he...[does] the
present philosophical environment, the works that have most recently been
added and put in circulation...[and by] entering into a personal exchange of
ideas with still living fellow philosophers. 15
Many hours of research were spent reading the books and articles that Husserl himself read
by his predecessors, peers, and students.

Many were also spent scouring Husserl’s

correspondence for help in interpreting his work. Much of that work did not end up being
explicitly included in the essays that follow. But in this connection, I feel the need to take
this opportunity to note that my interpretation of Husserl has been deeply influenced by the
work of Edith Stein, Dietrich Mahnke, Alexandre Koyré, Emmanuel Levinas, Aron

14

„Nur mit Hilfe der metaphysischen Annahme einer prästabilierten Harmonie gewinnt Husserl seine
phänomenologische Monadologie. Diese ist aber im eigentlichen Sinne gar keine Überwindung des
Solipsismus, sondern nur eine Erweiterung des »monistischen Solpsismus« zum »pluralistischen Solipsusmus«.“
(Theodor Celms, Die phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls, p.404)
15
Husserl, “Denial of Scientific Philosophy. Necessity of Reflection. The Reflection Must Be Historical. How
is History Required?” in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, p.392.
7

Gurwitsch, Eugen Fink, and Dorion Cairns. This is not to suggest that I believe Husserl’s
students “got him right,” whatever that might mean, but that they have given me insight into
how Husserl ought to be read, and where genuine shortcomings in his philosophy arise.
They have also taught me that such shortcomings are not reasons to reject Husserl’s
transcendental phenomenology, but that it is a work in progress, and that it is a philosophical
project capable of progress. So while I approach Husserl’s work in this dissertation as a
historian and an interpreter, I also am a defender of Husserl’s transcendental idealism.
Working out the details of this complete interpretation and defense will be the next stage of
my work.

8
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“Philosophy – we must frankly confess – moves slowly, and makes little progress. It deals
with simple things. It deals with being, with knowledge, with man. The questions it asks,
moreover, are simple questions: simple, and therefore permanently alive; simple, and thus
immensely difficult to grasp. It follows that the attempts of great philosophers to solve these
simple questions remain important, and ‘modern’, for hundreds and even for thousands of
years...Yet, in spite of this perennial aliveness of philosophical questions and answers – or
because of it – no philosophy, at least no authentic one, can be ‘abstracted’ from its context
in time. Not only does philosophy speak the language and use the concepts of its time – as it
must in order to be understood by its contemporaries – it grows from the deepest reflection
on the specific, burning problems of the age. Thus it belongs to an epoch and shares its
climate and its background, and these we must study in order fully to understand the
philosopher’s message.”
– Alexandre Koyré
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1

The “Metaphysical Conclusions” of Husserl’s Monadology

Over the past decade, there has been increasing interest in Husserl’s transcendental
idealism and the extent to which it can claim to be “metaphysically neutral.”

In

“Phenomenology and Metaphysics” (2003), Dan Zahavi argues that it is false to interpret
Husserl’s metaphysical neutrality as meaning that his transcendental idealism is, in principle,
compatible with any metaphysical framework.

As transcendental philosophy, Husserl’s

phenomenology brackets all metaphysical presuppositions, but this does not mean that it has
no implications for metaphysical theories. Zahavi further suggests that advocates of the
compatibilist

reading

sneak

a

pernicious

two-world

theory

into

transcendental

phenomenology by allowing for a distinction between phenomena and reality – one that
Husserl collapses. 1

He therefore proposes that Husserl’s transcendental idealism be

understood as minimally metaphysical. 2

Arthur David Smith’s book, Husserl and the

Cartesian Meditations (2003), muddies the water with respect to phenomenology’s
metaphysical neutrality even more.

By focussing on Husserl’s adoption of Leibnizian

monads, Smith argues that transcendental phenomenology is, in the end, committed to
overtly “metaphysical conclusions.”

The question I will address concerns the

substantiveness of these metaphysical conclusions, and which, if any, we can settle out and
discard (if necessary) from Husserl’s transcendental idealism.

1

Zahavi attributes such an interpretation to David Carr and Steven Crowell. This debate mirrors the one
currently taking place within Kant scholarship regarding the nature of transcendental idealism. See Dennis
Schulting, “Kant’s Idealism: The Current Debate,” in Kant's Idealism: New Interpretations of a Controversial
Doctrine, 2011. Zahavi’s own reading of Husserl is as follows: “Husserl’s transcendental idealism might
exactly be said to constitute such an attempt to undermine any commonsensical divide between mind and world.
As he writes in Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität III: “Transcendental subjectivity encompasses the
totality of the subjective, and this ultimately comprises the world itself as subjectively constituted” (Husserl,
1973b, p. 288), and as he states in the volume Transzendentaler Idealismus “The transcendental ego has no
exterior; the very suggestion is quite nonsensical” (Husserl, 2003, p. 179).” (Dan Zahavi, “Internalism,
externalism, and transcendental idealism,” Synthese 160 (2008), p.371)
2
Dan Zahavi, “Phenomenology and Metaphysics,” in Metaphysics, Facticity, Interpretation (2003), p.13 and
17.
11

In §60 of the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl outlines the “metaphysical results” of
his transcendental theory of empathy. However, he qualifies that these results are “anything
but metaphysics in the customary sense,” insofar as they involve no speculative excesses.
These results are “metaphysical” to the extent that they concern the a priori conditions of the
“ultimate cognitions of being [Seinserkenntnisse].” 3 Husserl frames these conclusions in
terms of a community of monads, and describes transcendental phenomenology as an
intersubjective monadology. Smith points out that there are at least two ways to understand
these results. On the weak reading, “the sense of [a community of monads] is implicit in my
experiencing a world with an objective sense, and that the actual existence of such a
community is conditionally apodictic – being inconsistent with an ultimately harmonious
experience.” 4 The stronger reading would have it that the actual existence of a community of
monads is unconditional, suggesting that my experience of an Objective world demonstrates
or depends on the existence in-themselves of other monads. 5 I find this second reading to be
both speculative and excessive. In keeping with the problematic that Husserl sets up at the
beginning of the ‘Fifth Meditation,’ I argue that we should adopt the weaker reading, that is,
one that focuses on the being-sense [Seinsinne] of the Objective world and of others, rather
than trying to tease out “proofs” for their existence in-themselves. 6 Philosophers must avoid
the common mistake of confusing “Objective,” “actual” and “real” existence with existence
in-itself. Husserl’s monadology should be kept, as far as possible, minimally metaphysical.
What is at stake here is not merely some esoteric point within Husserl scholarship, but a
point which concerns the nature of transcendental idealism more broadly conceived, namely,
that it can escape solipsism without devolving into speculative or dogmatic metaphysics.

3

Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p.139 <166>. Hereafter cited as CM.
A.D. Smith, Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations, p.234.
5
“Bearing in mind [Husserl’s] views on the divine entelechy of the world and the aseity of transcendental
monads, I believe that at least most of these statements should be taken in the stronger sense.” (A.D. Smith,
Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations, p.234-235. Emphasis added.)
6
As Husserl writes in the CM: “phenomenological explication is nothing like ‘metaphysical construction’; and
it is neither overtly nor covertly a theorizing with adopted presuppositions or helpful thoughts drawn from the
historical metaphysical tradition. It stands in sharpest contrast to all that.” (Husserl, CM, p.150 <177>) In doing
so, I hope to advance the reading of Husserl proposed by Peter Hutcheson and Kevin Hermberg.
12
4

1.1 Phenomenology’s claim to “metaphysical neutrality”
The demand that transcendental phenomenology be “metaphysically neutral” is not
the invention of commentators; it comes from Husserl himself. For instance, in The Idea of
Phenomenology, Husserl states that transcendental phenomenology is a philosophical method
that, “disregard[s] any metaphysical purpose...[and is confined] purely to the task of
clarifying the essence of cognition and of being an [possible] object of cognition.” 7 At the
end of Ideas I, Husserl emphasizes that the theory he has presented should not be confused
with “metaphysics,” 8 and that the phenomenological reduction puts all metaphysical claims
in brackets. Despite recent efforts to show that Husserl’s philosophy is not metaphysically
neutral, and that a continuous view of a phenomenologically grounded metaphysics runs
through both his pre- and post-transcendental turn writings, 9 I am hesitant to think that
Husserl ever abandons the requirement of metaphysical neutrality.

Whatever a

“phenomenological metaphysics” might be, it is not, at least in theory, dogmatic or
speculative metaphysics. 10 Husserl’s turn to transcendental philosophy was a turn away from
such systems of philosophy. Whether or not Husserl sometimes violates the requirement of
metaphysical neutrality, or if he sometimes voices certain metaphysical beliefs, is a side
issue. 11 Against the metaphysical reading of Husserl, I argue that metaphysical neutrality, in
some yet to be determined sense, is an inborn feature of transcendental phenomenology. 12

7

Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, p.18.
Husserl, Ideas I, p.359 <313>. Husserl repeats this sentiment in §153: “The phenomenologist does not judge
ontologically when he cognizes an ontological concept or principle as an index to constitutive eidetic
complexes...” (Husserl, Ideas I, p.369 <323>)
9
Nam-In Lee, “Husserl’s View of Metaphysics: The Role of Genuine Metaphysics in Phenomenological
Philosophy,” in Phenomenology 2005, Vol.1, Selected Essays from Asia (2007).
10
Speculative metaphysics appeals to a supersensible realm of entities in order to account for the realm of
appearances. Dogmatic metaphysics uncritically posits or accepts the existence of entities without being able to
account for their existence in the face of skepticism.
11
Unless blatantly metaphysical statements can be shown to follow necessarily from the basic tenants of
Husserl’s mature position, or unless they occur regularly and consistently, they pose no real threat to the
neutrality thesis. Passages from early texts, unpublished working notes, personal correspondence, and so on,
should always be read in light of the published materials which represent Husserl’s mature position, and not the
other way around. A strong case would have to be made in order to convince any serious scholar that, say,
Husserl’s belief in the existence of God, counts against his theoretical commitment to the metaphysical
neutrality of his transcendental phenomenology. The potential incompatibility of these beliefs demonstrates
little more than Husserl’s humanness.
12
Zahavi does a fine job of explaining metaphysical neutrality as it is originally presented by Husserl in the
Logical Investigations. However, in Husserl’s mature thought, what was once a guiding, but perhaps
extraneous, principle of phenomenology becomes an inherent part of it.
13
8

To abandon it as an “unnecessary limitation” is to no longer be doing transcendental
philosophy, and thus, for Husserl, to no longer be doing rigorous, scientific philosophy. 13
While we could embark on a lengthy historical excursus to determine precisely what
Husserl means when he speaks about metaphysics, or who he has in mind as opponents, we
can refrain from such a project for our present purposes. We can safely assume that Husserl
understands the main task of metaphysics to be answering questions concerning the nature
and existence of reality – specifically external reality, comprised of ‘genuine
transcendencies.’ From the transcendental standpoint, metaphysics defined in this manner is
nonsensical, if not impossible. If a scientific or non-speculative metaphysics that investigates
the nature and existence of such a reality is possible, then it can only hope to be achieved
once we have first answered the problems of transcendental philosophy. These problems
concern our cognition of the world, and the meaning of its existence. As Dermot Moran
explains, “Transcendental philosophy, as it came to be understood with Kant, is concerned
not so much with elaborating a metaphysical account of the objective world as with a
justification of our sense of that world as objective. It is a formal inquiry into the conditions
for the possibility of knowledge.” 14 We ought not to expect that in answering these questions
we will ultimately pave the way for a scientific metaphysics that investigates being-as-such
apart from being-for-an-I. We may well find that no such metaphysics can be constructed.
In opposition to a metaphysics that purports to study external reality in-itself, the field
of research of Husserlian phenomenology is transcendental subjectivity, which is opened up
for us by the phenomenological reduction. Phenomenology, at least in its transcendental
form, 15 does not content itself with a merely descriptive analysis of particular intentional
objects we might find in this field, taken as pure phenomena. Likewise, it is not a mere
description of the various modes of intentional consciousness, that is, a description of the
relational structures which holds between the thinking ego and its objects. The aim of
transcendental phenomenology is to uncover the essential features of consciousness – the
“immanent a priori” intentional structures that condition all possible and actual experience,
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Perhaps a phenomenological metaphysics stands in a similar relationship to transcendental phenomenology as
phenomenological psychology. I will leave this for others to explore.
14
Dermot Moran, Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology, p.175
15
I do, of course, accept that transcendental phenomenology is only one branch of phenomenology. But I am
inclined to think that it is perhaps the trunk of this family tree.
14

all possible cognition as such.

According to Husserl, this can be attained through a

systematic investigation of my own transcendentally reduced ego and how it constitutes its
objects, that is, “the sense of its own transcendental functions.” 16 Carried out in systematic
concreteness, “phenomenology is eo ipso ‘transcendental idealism’.” 17
The phenomenological-transcendental reduction, along with eidetic analysis,
“determine, through and through, the legitimate sense of a transcendental phenomenology.” 18
The phenomenological reduction requires that I bracket, or put out of play, all my naive
judgments and acceptances concerning the metaphysical nature of things. This is the basis
for the claim that metaphysical neutrality is an inborn and essential feature of any legitimate
transcendental phenomenology. As a phenomenologist operating in the transcendentally
reduced field of my own ego, I neither make nor accept any claims about what the objects of
my experience might be beyond what they are in my experience. If I stray from this, I am no
longer doing rigorous or legitimate philosophy. Husserl’s principle of all principles states:
that every originary presentative intuition is a legitimizing source of
cognition, that everything originarily (so to speak, in its “personal” actuality)
offered to us in “intuition” is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as
being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there. 19
From the standpoint of transcendental phenomenology, the phenomena as they are
constituted in consciousness are the “things themselves.” This phenomenology is concerned
with the constitution of intentional objects in and by my own consciousness, that is, with
what they are, as they are, for me. Husserl writes:
...nothing exists for me otherwise than by virtue of the actual and potential
performance of my own consciousness…Whatever I encounter as an existing
object is something that…has received its whole being-sense [Seinssinn] for
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Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, p.274 <242>. Hereafter cited as FTL. FTL §104 might be the
clearest explanation of his own transcendental idealism that Husserl gives.
17
Husserl, CM, p.86 <118>. This is not to say that Husserl is a Kantian. In fact, Husserl himself points out that
while Kant’s philosophy was an important precursor to transcendental phenomenology (see Ideas I, p.142 <118119> and FTL, §100), he sees essential differences between the two, particularly the fact that Kant believes he
can “keep open, at least as a limiting concept, the possibility of a world of things in themselves.” (Husserl, CM,
p.86 <118>)
18
Husserl, CM, p.72 <106>
19
Husserl, Ideas I, p.44 <43-44>
15

me from my effective intentionality; not a shadow of that sense remains
excluded from my effective intentionality. 20
Objects exist for me, and are for me what they are, only as objects of actual
and possible consciousness. 21
Every real thing, and ultimately the whole world as it exists for us in such and
such a way, only exists as an actual or possible cogitatum of our own
cogitatio, as a possible experiential content of our own experience...Thus, for
us, true being is a name for products of actual and possible cognitive
operations, an accomplishment of cognition (Erkenntnisleistung). 22
Whatever sort of being-sense an object of experience might have is posited by consciousness,
and “beyond that it is nothing.” 23 All objects of experience have “merely intentional being,”
in the sense of being for a consciousness, and this does not entail any sort of “metaphysical
hypostatization.” 24 Mind independent things-in-themselves, as the realist conceives them,
are nonsensical, metaphysical fictions, insofar as they are not even possible objects of
cognition.
Regarding the existence of things-in-themselves, Husserl is careful to distance his
version of transcendental idealism from Kant’s, or at least certain readings of Kant.
According to Husserl, transcendental idealism must, “from the outset go beyond all of the, in
the worst sense of the word, ‘metaphysical’ stock elements of the critique of reason (like the
doctrine of the thing-in-itself...), that oppose the phenomenological transcendentalism and
with it the deepest sense and legitimacy of the Kantian position.” 25

Husserl defines

transcendental idealism as the study of the transcendental subject taken as, “the primal locus
and primal source of all sense-bestowal and truth achievements, and therewith, of all true
objectivities and true worlds (and no less, all fictitious ones),” and such a theory:
leaves no room for ‘metaphysical’ substructurings of a being behind the being
intentionally constituting itself in actual and possible achievements of
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Husserl, FTL, p.234 <207>
Husserl, CM, p.65 <99>
22
Husserl, Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology, p. 236.
23
Husserl, Ideas I, p.112 <93>. In Copy A, Husserl notes that worldly objects are constituted in consciousness
as “harmonious” unities of multiplicities of appearances, both across time and space, and across particular
(possible) consciousnesses. Their being anything beyond this is a “countersensical thought.”
24
Husserl, Ideas I, p.41 <41>
25
Husserl, “Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy,” The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 5:3
(1974), p.13
16
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consciousness, whether it be a matter of an in-itself of nature or an in-itself of
souls, in-itself of history, an in-itself of eidetic objectivities, and of ideal ones
of whatever type...Metaphysics in the common sense of the word, referring to
[a realm of] transcendences [which are] in principle trans-subjective,
is...contrary to sense, as must be made evident. Therefore, only if we
disregard such constituent elements, which for Kant’s philosophy, of course,
are not indifferent, will we transcendental phenomenologists be able to
confirm Kant’s genuine intuitions.26
In defining the nature of his project, Husserl is clear that he rejects outright the notion of
things existing in-themselves, no matter what one might choose to define such things to be.
From the phenomenological standpoint, transcendences defined in this way are nonsense.
Insofar as metaphysics refers to such nonsensical entities it cannot be considered rigorous,
scientific philosophy and must therefore be kept apart from phenomenological-transcendental
idealism. 27
Transcendental phenomenology is a rigorous, scientific investigation of all possible
cognition, and thus an explication of the being-sense of all actual and possible objects of
cognition. It might therefore be characterized as a “transcendental theory of knowledge,” as
Husserl himself indicates. 28 Such a project disregards any metaphysical purposes. 29 But
insofar as it explores all possible objects of cognition, it certainly will lead to a set of
epistemic conditions which limit the sorts of metaphysical claims or distinctions one can
legitimately make. Husserl was quick to reproach transcendental realism and subjective
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Husserl, “Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy,” p.14
In a note to his Fichte Lectures (1917/18), Husserl writes: “There is no meaning in saying: A world exists in
itself and consciousness is an incidental event in it. Rather the world is nothing else than a lawful structure of
appearances of consciousness encompassing all conscious subjects…and over and above this they have no
meaningful existence.” (Husserl, “Fichte’s Ideal of Humanity,” Husserl Studies 12 (1995), p.132)
27

28

Husserl, CM, p.81 <114-115>. In Intersubjectivity and Transcendental Idealism (1988), James Mensch
insists on the independence and priority of epistemology with respect to metaphysics. See Intersubjectivity and
Transcendental Idealism, p.5-15.
29
“If we then disregard the metaphysical purposes of the critique of knowledge and attend solely to its task of
clarifying the essence of knowledge and known objectivity, then it is a phenomenology of knowledge and
known objectivity, which forms the first and fundamental part of phenomenology in general. Phenomenology:
this term designates a science, a complex of scientific disciplines; but it also designates at the same time and
above all a method and an attitude of thought: the specifically philosophical attitude of thought, the specifically
philosophical method.” (Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, p.19) In the Paris Lectures, Husserl also states
that, “phenomenology excludes only that type of metaphysics which deals with naive and contradictory objects,
but it does not exclude metaphysics altogether.” (Husserl, Paris Lectures, p.38) Here Husserl explains that the
traditional problems of metaphysics can still be posed, but their sense or meaning is to be determined
phenomenologically.
17

idealism on exactly these terms. 30 Here we begin to see what it means for Husserl to be
metaphysically neutral, or at least minimally metaphysical. In Ideas II, Husserl states that,
“[transcendental] phenomenology actually has within its field of view all questions that can
be put to man in the concrete, including as well all so-called metaphysical questions, insofar
as they have possible sense in the first place, for it is their original formulation and critical
delimitation which is precisely the vocation of this phenomenology.” 31 Questions about the
nature of being are not annihilated by the phenomenological reduction; the goal of
phenomenology is not to answer these questions. However, the results yielded through
transcendental phenomenology will tell us if they have any possible sense.

Some

metaphysical claims, such as those concerning the existence of things-in-themselves, may
turn out to be nonsense.

Therefore, the fact that the conditions of possible cognition

elaborated by transcendental phenomenology might limit the scope of legitimate
metaphysics, does not demonstrate that phenomenology is itself metaphysical.
The sense of metaphysical neutrality that Husserl endorses is not one where his
philosophy has no metaphysical implications, but where transcendental phenomenology
proper, as a general rule, neither presupposes nor makes strong, positive, or speculative
metaphysical claims regarding being in-itself. The one exception to this is the claim that the
“pure” or transcendental ego necessarily exists in-itself and for-itself, and that the Ego is a
monad. 32 However, this ego is not some entity presupposed by Husserl’s philosophy, but a
non-substantive, unifying, centering, subject-pole of experience which he believes must exist.
Metaphysical neutrality so delimited is an intrinsic limit on the legitimacy and scope of
transcendental phenomenology. 33 Phenomenology is not about proving or demonstrating the

30

Zahavi, “Phenomenology and Metaphysics,” p.8.
Husserl, Ideas II, p.408. Emphasis added.
32
“Though the phenomenologist, in all his transcendental descriptions, does not pass the slightest judgment
about the world and about his human Ego as a mundane being, nevertheless he does constantly make a
judgment about his Ego, indeed a judgment affirming its existence; but now this is the transcendental Ego, i.e.,
the Ego as a being absolutely in itself and for itself, ‘prior’ to all mundane being, which only in this Ego first
acquires ontological validity.” (Husserl, Ideas II, p.413) See also FTL §102-104; CM §11; Ideas I §49, §57
(with §46); Hua XXXVI, Nr.3.
33
I offer this is a friendly amendment to the following statement by Zahavi: “One could argue that metaphysical
issues are pseudoproblems and that the rejection of metaphysics is consequently a liberating move. One could
argue that metaphysical problems are real problems, but that phenomenology lacks the resources to tackle these
problems, for which reason the neutrality is totally appropriate. And finally, one could argue that
phenomenology has metaphysical implications and consequently deplore the neutrality as an unnecessary
limitation. In the end these three different responses might be less incompatible than one might think at first
18
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existence of anything. It gives a critical account of phenomena by arguing for the conditions
under which the cognition of such objects is possible. As it turns out, things-in-themselves
are not possible objects of cognition. If we abandon the metaphysical neutrality requirement,
then we undermine the purpose of Husserl’s entire project since it could no longer claim to
be rigorous or scientific if we do so. Because of this, the neutrality requirement is a valuable
interpretive tool. We should be suspicious of readings of Husserl’s that come into conflict
with the neutrality requirement.
Before turning to Husserl’s monadology and its “metaphysical conclusions,” I want to
acknowledge that my use of the term “epistemic conditions” in our considerations up to this
point is no accident. It is borrowed from Henry E. Allison, specifically his work on Kant’s
transcendental idealism. 34 However, the Kantian turn of phrase conditions of the possibility
of experience/cognition (Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung/Erkennens) is used by
Husserl throughout his works, specifically in the context of conditions of the possibility of
the experience of others and of an Objective world. 35 Husserl often labels the discussions of

glance. Thus...there might be metaphysical pseudo-problems which phenomenology is wise to abandon,
metaphysical questions which is beyond its reach, and metaphysical questions which it is capable of addressing.
(Zahavi, “Phenomenology and Metaphysics,” p.16)
34
Henry Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense, 2nd ed. (2004). Allison was a
student of Aron Gurwitsch, who studied under Husserl, Carl Stumpf, and Moritz Geiger. In Gurwitsch’s essay
“The Kantian and Husserlian Conceptions of Consciousness,” he suggests that Husserl’s phenomenology is a
natural continuation of the Leibnizian and Kantian projects, which characterized consciousness in terms of the
activity of a monad or transcendental ego. Iso Kern suggests that while Husserl is critical of Kant, Husserl also
believes that Kant’s investigations are de facto operating at the level of transcendental phenomenology. Similar
to Gurwitsch, he argues that Husserl sought to understand Kant’s ego-subject and its faculties in light of
Leibniz’s monads. Kern writes: „In den Zwanziger Jahren wie dann auch im letzten Jahrzehnt von Husserls
Leben finden wir immer wieder der Auffassung Ausdruck gegeben, dass sich Kants Forschungen de facto auf
transzendental-phänomenologischer Ebene abspielen. Husserl versuchte in jener Zeit das Kantische Subjekt
von der Monade Leibnizens her zu verstehen, dessen Einfluss auf Kant er in seinen philosophiegeschichtlichen
Vorlesungen stark hervorhob. Die Kantische Vermögenstheorie zeigte sich ihm so als eine "flüchtige
monadologische Interpretation psychologischer Lehren". Die Monade Leibnizens deutete Husserl als
Cartesianisches reines Ego. Wir finden also den an Kant gerichteten Vorwurf des Psychologismus einerseits
und die transzendental-phänomenologische Interpretation des Kantischen Subjekts bei Husserl gleichzeitig,
obschon jener Vorwurf immer mehr zurückgeht, und diese Interpretation sich immer sicherer äussert. Selbst in
den allerletzten Jahren war Husserl noch immer der Auffassung, dass Kants Vernunftkritik nicht gänzlich rein
von dogmatisch-psychologischen Momenten sei, wenn er auch in den Prager Vorträgen eine psychologische
Kantinterpretation als grundverkehrt ablehnt.“ (Iso Kern, Husserl und Kant, p.75)
35
See for example: Hua XI, p.152; Hua XV, p.616-617; Hua XXXV, p.36, 373; Hua XXXVI, p.148. This is by
no means a comprehensive list. Husserl’s use of this turn of phrase deserves a separate and thorough treatment
of its own. It is also worth noting in this connection that in the Paris Lectures, Husserl writes that following the
method of phenomenological reduction, the second “most important insight” in phenomenology is that “the
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such conditions as phenomenological “metaphysics” or “formal ontology” but always in
scare quotes to indicate that he is not using these terms in the traditional sense. While I think
the concept of epistemic conditions is useful here for our understanding of Husserl’s
transcendental idealism, it must take on certain nuances. Epistemic conditions in Husserl’s
philosophy are still, “necessary condition[s] for the representation of objects...condition[s]
without which our representations would not...possess objective reality,” and as “conditions
of the possibility of representing objects,” they are still to be distinguished from both
psychological and ontological conditions. 36 But this is not to say that Husserl’s philosophy
can be reduced to the Kantian one, since we have already pointed to a separation between
these views above. Nevertheless, some sort of “epistemological” interpretation, in keeping
with the argument in favor of metaphysical neutrality/‘minimalism’ above, is both warranted
and useful.

1.2 To what is Husserl’s intersubjective monadology a response?
A.D Smith’s discussion of the “metaphysical conclusions” that follow from Husserl’s
transcendental idealism presents a further challenge to the neutrality requirement. According
to Smith, the Cartesian Meditations culminate in, “an out-and-out idealism...with which very
few today will have any sympathy at all.” 37 Herein we will be concerned with Husserl’s
adoption of the Leibnizian term “monad” as a name for the concrete Ego, 38 and his

ego...possesses an enormous inborn a priori.” (Husserl, Paris Lectures, p.28) According to Husserl, this is the
genuine sense of ‘innate’ ideas that Leibniz had sought to explain: there are general conscious-structures that
are conditions of all possible cognition.
36
Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense, p.11. We must also note that for
Husserl these are not conditions on human cognition, since for him the transcendental ego is not yet the human
ego.
37
A.D. Smith, Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations, p.107.
38
“The ego, taken in full concreteness, we propose to call by the Leibnizian name: monad.” (Husserl, CM, p.6768 <102>; „Ein Ego, eine Monade, eine transzendentale Subjektivität kann also derart sein, daß sich im Rahmen
ihres absoluten Bewußtseins ein anderes absolutes Ego ausdrückt, durch die Art des Ausdrucks seine
fortgehende vernünftige Bestätigung findet und demgemäß rechtmäßig zu setzen ist als seiende Wirklichkeit.
Aber es ist seinem eigenen Sinn nach wirklich, nicht in der bloßen Weise eines Körpers, eines bloß
intentionalen Pols, sondern in der Weise eben eines Ego, eines absoluten Seins, eines sich selbst erlebenden und
sich für sich selbst konstituierenden. Für mich, der ich den anderen nicht ursprünglich, sondern in der Form der
vergegenwärtigenden, indizierenden Einfühlung erfahre, ist der andere eben anderer, alter ego, Objekt, aber ein
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subsequent description of the community of monads. More specifically, without getting
wrapped up in the details of Husserl’s theory of empathy, I will assess the purported
metaphysical implications that Smith finds in these texts. The first step in understanding
Husserl’s intersubjective monadology and its “metaphysical conclusions” consists in
identifying the problem that Husserl is attempting to address by them. Second, we must
clarify why this problem arises and why it is a threat. The purpose of this section is to
accomplish these two preliminary tasks before carrying out more detailed interpretive
analysis. It is only once we know the problem to which Husserl is responding that we can
properly interpret his response to it.
Above all others, Husserl regarded the problem of solipsism as the greatest threat to
his transcendental phenomenology. He describes it as the “transcendental illusion” that
“from the outset misleads, and usually paralyses any attempt to start a consistent
transcendental philosophy. If everything I can ever accept as existent is constituted in my
ego, then everything that exists does indeed seem to be a mere moment of my own
transcendental being.” 39 While Husserl revisits this problem time and again in his writings, it
receives special attention in the CM. The ‘Fifth Meditation’ is a protracted response to the
problem of solipsism, or, more precisely, what Husserl calls the problem of transcendental
solipsism. Husserl summarizes the general worry generated by his position as follows:
Starting from the transcendental ego of the phenomenological reduction and
thenceforth restricted to it, phenomenology is incapable of solving [problems
concerning the possibility of Objective knowledge]. Without admitting that it
does so, it lapses into a transcendental solipsism; and the whole step leading to
other subjectivity and to genuine Objectivity is possible only by virtue of an
unacknowledged metaphysics, a concealed adoption of Leibnizian traditions. 40
If, due to the phenomenological reduction, we are forced to remain strictly within the realm
of my own transcendental subjectivity, then it seems transcendental phenomenology leads,
necessarily, to some form of solipsism or it is dogmatic (and is therefore unscientific). The

Objekt, das nicht bloß Objekt ist, sondern für sich selbst Subjekt ist, so wie ich in noch ursprünglicherer Form
Subjekt und für mich selbst zugleich Objekt bin.“ (Husserl, Hua XXXV, p.282)
39
Husserl, FTL, p.241 <213>.
40
Husserl, CM, p.148 <174>.
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purpose of the ‘Fifth Meditation’ is, however, to show that the above objection is
“groundless.”
The traditional problem of solipsism is a consequence of the three skeptical theses
presented by Gorgias:
1) No external objects exist. (In fact, nothing exists, not even space and
time.)
2) If an external object were to exist, it would be both unknowable and
inconceivable.
3) If some external object were knowable, this knowledge could not be
communicated to others. 41
Variants of this problem are typically divided into two categories: metaphysical solipsism
and epistemological solipsism. Metaphysical solipsism entails that only my mind and its
contents exist, whereas epistemological solipsism entails that all we can know to exist is our
own mind and its content. Philosophical idealism is particularly susceptible to this skeptical
challenge. But the version of the problem that Husserl faces (or at least the one he takes on)
is distinct from these. First, Husserl states that the concern is not about the existence of
external objects, but mind-independent objects which exist in-themselves.
The basic idea of the skepticism of Gorgias and Protagoras was this: the world
for me, the person who thinks it, is given to me in my thinking, only as it is
experienced and thought by me. The subjective experience, the subjective
representation is not what is presented. It is commonly said and admitted that
something can be represented as being external to us. I have therefore always
only my subjective phenomena, my ideas. How can I claim that more than my
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Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, 7.65-86 = 82B3. In Skeptizismus in der Philosophie und
siene Ueberwindung, Raoul Richter writes: „Gorgias aber huldigte einem völligen Nihilismus, den er zum Teil
mit eleatischen Gedankenreihen stützte, in seinen drei Thesen: es ist nichts; gäbe es etwas, so wäre es
unerkennbar; wäre es erkennbar, so wäre es nichts mitteilbar.“ (Richter, Skeptizismus in der Philosophie und
siene Ueberwindung, Bd.1, p.15 [BQ 382/1]) Husserl also refers to Gorgias in a similar way at F I 42/26a:
„Möglichkeiten: extremer Skeptizismus. Unbedingte Leugnung aller Wahrheit. Nicht bloss die Lösung des
Zweifels, sondern der Zweifel selbst ist nur möglich unter Voraussetzung irgendeiner anerkannten Wahrheit.
Wer auf einen xx aus der Skepzis schöpft, gibt dies eigentlich zu. Ein Weg kann nur gefunden werden durch
die Untersuchung, Untersuchung setzt aber mindestens formale Grundsetzung der Beurteilung voraus, nach
denen Richtigkeit und Unrichtigkeit zu bemessen ist. Der Skeptizismus mit seinen drei Thesen (Gorgias)
widerspricht <sich> selbst. Keine demonstrative Widerlegung der Skepzis möglich.“
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representations and my mind, that the things presented and thought, exist in
themselves? 42
Since Husserl’s transcendental idealism accepts the existence of the external world, but
denies the existence of things-in-themselves in the usual sense, neither of the traditional
versions of problem of solipsism would seem to threaten him. Husserl admits, however, that
phenomenology at least begins as a sort of solipsistic enterprise. The problem is to escape
transcendental solipsism, a task which Dorion Cairns says consists in, “explaining the
constitution of transcendental other mind(s).” 43 As stated above, Husserl thinks that this is
necessary in order for the transcendental idealist to reclaim Objectivity, since the path to
doing so consists in explaining how certain objects of consciousness are not constituted as
being merely subjective but intersubjective.
Husserl argues for the universality of the results of transcendental phenomenology
early on in the CM. There he explains how we proceed from a particular cognition, taken as
a “transcendental clue,” to the universal “unconditioned” eidos cognition it is a token of. 44 In
this way, every de facto cognition, “can be thought of merely as exemplifying a pure
possibility.” 45 By this method of eidetic analysis, Husserl argues that we come to universal
a priori conditions or laws of cognition that hold for the pure transcendental ego as such. My
concrete ego is just a particular set of possible cognitions that have been actualized out of an
infinite number of possible cognitions. 46
Husserl admits that transcendental phenomenology begins as a “pure egology and as a
science that apparently condemns us to solipsism, albeit a transcendental solipsism.” 47 From
the solipsistic standpoint of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction, Husserl must
explain how other subjects, not as mere worldly phenomena but as other transcendental egos,
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„Der Grundgedanke der Skepsis der Gorgias und Protagoras war der: Die Welt ist mir, dem erkennenden
Menschen, nur als von mir erfahrene und in meinem Denken gedachte gegeben. Das subjektive Erfahren, das
subjektive Vorstellen ist nicht das Vorgestellte. Allgemein sagt man ja und gibt zu, dass etwas vorgestellt sein,
erscheinen könne, ohne zu sein. Ich habe also immer nur meine subjektiven Erscheinungen, meine
Vorstellungen. Wie kann ich dann aber je behaupten, dass mehr ist als meine Vorstellen und mein Denken,
dass ein Vorgestelltes und Gedachtes an sich ist?“ (Husserl, Erste Philosophie, Hua VII, p.342)
43
Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink, p.90.
44
Husserl, CM, p.50-53 <87-89>. For more on Husserl’s use of the phrase “transcendental clue,” see CM, p.9091 <122-123>, p.138-139 <165>; FTL, p.245 <217>, p.262 <231>, p.269 <237>, p.293 <257>.
45
Husserl, CM, p.71 <105>.
46
Husserl, CM, p.71-72 <105-106>. This will be expanded later in the present work.
47
Husserl, CM, p.30 <69>.
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are constituted as such. He continues, “Perhaps reduction to the transcendental ego only
seems to entail a permanently solipsistic science; whereas the consequential elaboration of
this science, in accordance with its own sense, leads over to a phenomenology of
transcendental intersubjectivity and, by means of this, to a universal transcendental
philosophy.” 48

The second stage of phenomenology is to move from transcendental

solipsism to transcendental intersubjectivity, that is, to an intersubjective monadology.
Again, the question of most importance here is what sort of solipsism Husserl is
attempting to avoid. In a text from the spring of 1933, Husserl writes that there is a “Twofold problem concerning solipsism” that arises from his Ideas:
a) first, there is this problem of the possibility of a solipsistic world, that is, the
conceivability of a solitary existing ego-subject in a surrounding world
[Umwelt], which does not, at least in terms of its own sense of existing
[Seinsinne], have any reference to other ego-subjects; b) another problem
concerns how if the world, which is for me, can only derive its sense of being
out of my life of consciousness, whether it is possible to avoid the problem of
solipsism.49
The first problem is one where I exist in a world that has no reference to others, and in the
second, there may be others, but the world simply is what it is for me. The problem which
seems to threaten Husserl is the second. He also wonders if it is possible that what we call
“the world” is really just a closed box, with nothing external to it, and everyone else with
whom we communicate is included in it. This might be how madmen [Verrückten] constitute
the world, but not the rest of us. 50 In a supplement to Erste Philosophie II, “Begründung des
transzendentalen idealismus. Radikale Überwindung des Solipsismus,” Husserl attacks both
the traditional problem of solipsism and the transcendental problem of solipsism. According
to Husserl, the phenomenological reduction is not a reduction to a solus ipse.
A solipsism that declares: I, a psychic being, alone exist; everything else is
merely phenomena – is nonsense…Even the variation of solipsism into the
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Husserl, CM, p.30 <69>.
„Zweierlei Probleme des Solipsismus: a) Ein anderes ist also dieses Problem der Möglichkeit einer
solipsistischen Welt, also der Erdenklichkeit eines allein seienden Ichsubjekts in einer Umwelt, die nicht das
Mindeste in ihrem Seinssinn hätte, das auf andere Ichsubjekte verweist, b) und ein anderes das Problem, wie,
wenn die Welt, die für mich ist, ihren Seinssinn nur aus meinem Bewusstseinsleben schöpfen kann, es möglich
sei, den Solipsismus zu vermeiden.“ (Husserl, Hua XV, p.562)
50
Husserl, Hua XV, p.562-563.
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transcendental, which already makes the correct distinction between the ego
and transcendental subjectivity, means that the phenomenological reduction
and the transcendental interpretation of nature levels [hebe] every possible
foreign subjectivity, even a transcendental one, is nonsense. 51
Here Husserl writes that the phenomenological reduction is not a reduction to a solus ipse. It
leads neither to solipsism in the “personalistic” sense, where only my mind exists, nor to a
transcendental solipsism where the phenomenological reduction eliminates every other
possible subjectivity, including other transcendental subjects.

Both of these positions,

according to Husserl, are “nonsense.”
In Interpreting Husserl (1987), David Carr correctly points out that, “Husserl is not at
all concerned with the problem of solipsism in any traditional sense, and that the ‘solution’
he offers, when understood in light of Husserl’s understanding of the problem,” 52 should not
be confused with the Cartesian attempt to infer the existence of the external world from the
existence of the ego. According to Carr, the transcendental problem of solipsism can be
explained as follows:
The task which arises is to explain how the other exists for [me], not whether
the other exists as such. What is sought, then, is a specifically
phenomenological concept of the alter ego, that is, one that will fit into the
overall scheme of phenomenological investigation, the scheme indicated by
the words ego-cogito-cogitatum-qua-cogitatum. And when Husserl places the
objection of ‘solipsism’ into the mouth of his imaginary critic, it is the
possibility of just such a concept that is being questioned in principle...his
ability to make ‘phenomenological sense’ of other egos. There is simply no
place in the phenomenological scheme, he argues, for the alter ego. In that
scheme everything must be either ego, cogitatio, or cogitatum, and the alter
ego presents us with the apparent paradox of a cogitatum cogitans. 53
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„Gegen den Solipsismus, den personalen und seelischen wie auch den transzendentalen. Die
phänomenologishce Reduktion keine Reduktion auf einen solus ipse.
Ein solipsismus, der sagt: Ich, das seelische Wesen, bin allein alles andere ist bloss Phänomen - ist
Unsinn...Aber auch die Abwandlung des Solipsismus ins Transzendentale, die schon die korrekte Scheidung
zwischen Ich und tranzendentaler Subjektivität macht und die meint, die phänomenologishce Reduktion und die
transzendentale Interpretation der Natur hebe jede mögliche Setzung fremder Subjektivität, auch
transzendentaler, auf, ist Unsinn.“ (Husserl, Hua VIII, p.496-497)
52
David Carr, Interpreting Husserl, p.46.
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Carr, Interpreting Husserl, p.50. Just above this, Carr makes another important point: “Husserl is not
concerned with showing that different egos are possible or conceivable. In a sense the possibility of different
egos has already been taken into account by the very eidetic approach of phenomenology. By taking the
particular objects of transcendental reflection as merely exemplary, Husserl seeks to describe the structure of
any consciousness at all. That not all possibilities can be construed as possibilities of my consciousness is ruled
out by the concept of the monad as a system of compossibilities. Not all possibilities of consciousness are
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The critic who charges Husserl with transcendental solipsism claims that he cannot fit the
notion of another transcendental ego in the intentional model of consciousness, that there can
be no genuine sense of another subject. On this reading, Husserl must in some way argue his
way around what appears to be a logical impossibility entailed by the theory of intentionality
when coupled with the phenomenological reduction, and explain the sense of an alter ego. 54
The problem is to explain the sense of the existence of other egos, and to seek out the a priori
epistemic conditions that make the cognition of an Objective world and other transcendental
egos possible.
In Intersubjectivity and Transcendental Idealism (1988), James Mensch presents us
with another way of understanding the problem of transcendental solipsism. On his reading,
transcendental solipsism emerges out of an epistemological concern.
This ‘transcendental solipsism’ springs from the fact that I can verify through
direct perception only those statements which are true for me – i.e., those
which have a merely private, subjective validity. To claim more than this, I
must apparently make what Husserl terms a ‘metaphysical’ assertion. This is
a statement that cannot be phenomenologically grounded...Insofar as objective
knowledge does imply Others, the objection Husserl is raising concerns their
existence as perceiving subjects. The objection is that such existence must
remain
a
‘metaphysical’
assumption
of
phenomenology...[The
phenomenological reduction] necessarily involves a suspension of belief in the
existence of Others as having the same perceptual evidence for an assertion as
I myself have. The objection here is that there is no way to re-establish this
belief in terms of direct perception of the Other... 55
If Husserl wants to say that Objective knowledge implies the existence of other subjects, then
it seems that he must make a metaphysical assumption about the existence of other subjects.
However, there is no way to establish the existence of other subjects understood as other

compossible with all others, and certain conceivable possibilities would rule out my actual present and past.
They would have to be other than they are, a different stream of consciousness involved in a different system of
possibilities. The monad as such a system of compossibilities makes no sense except by reference to other
possible systems, and this is why Husserl speaks in the Cartesian Meditations not only of the eidos of
consciousness, the instances of which could potentially all belong to one stream of experience, but of the eidos
ego whose instances are different and incompatible streams of experience.” (Carr, Interpreting Husserl, p.4950)
54
Peter Hutcheson also argues in favor of this reading of the ‘Fifth Meditation.’ See Hutcheson, “Solipsistic and
Intersubjective Phenomenology,” p.167-168.
55
Mensch, Intersubjectivity and Transcendental Idealism, p.17-18.
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transcendental egos like myself based on direct perception. Not only is an empirical truth
that “another’s psychic life is essentially inaccessible to me in direct perception,” 56 it is
logically impossible for me to experience the experiences of someone else. The claim is that
insofar as this is the case, Husserl has no way of explaining either the existence of other
subjects, or the existence of an Objective world that is “there for everyone.”
These two ways of understanding the problem of transcendental solipsism are not as
different as they first appear. In both cases, what is important for Husserl is explaining the
sense of other egos in a way that is consistent with the basic tenets of transcendental
phenomenology. They both focus on other transcendental egos, since the other possible
perspectives of an Objective world must somehow relate to these. When Husserl argues for
the incompossibility of my concrete monad having these different perspectives, he thereby
shows that the infinite a priori possible perspectives are not all “mine” in the sense that
solipsism would require. 57 He must therefore make sense of other egos, while, at the same
time, avoid positing their existence in-themselves and for-themselves.

Next we must

investigate the being-sense of others as they are constituted in experience, taken as a
“transcendental clue,” to some a priori epistemic condition that makes an Objective, shared,
external world possible. 58 The whole of Husserl’s transcendental idealism relies on his
ability to do this. While everything which exists receives its entire being-sense from my
effective intentionality, in the case of external “physical” objects which are constituted in
experience, this sense includes different possible perspectives, that is, perspectives that are
other than my own.

This includes other possible first person perspectives which are

incompossible with my actual lived-experience, but are a priori possible perspectives of
other transcendental egos, and which are harmoniously united with those experiences that are
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Husserl, FTL, p.233 <206>
In On the Problem of Empathy, Edith Stein writes the following: “The perceived world and the world given
empathetically are the same world differently seen. But it is not only the same world seen from different sides
as when I perceive primordially and, traversing continuous varieties of appearances, go from one standpoint to
another…The same world is not merely presented now in one way and then in another, but in both ways at the
same time. And not only is it differently presented depending on the momentary standpoint, but also depending
on the nature of the observer. This makes the appearance of the world dependent on individual consciousness,
but the appearing world…is the same, however and to whomever it appears…Thus empathy as the basis of
intersubjective experience becomes the condition of possible knowledge of the existing outer world, as Husserl
and also Royce present it.” (Edith Stein, On the Problem of Empathy, p.64 <72>) Stein argues here that this
amounts to something of a proof for the existence in-itself of the external world. However, we know from her
‘Foreword’ to the text that she was aware that this reading was incompatible with Husserl’s views.
58
Husserl, CM, p.90-92 <123-124>.
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my peculiarly own. 59

Here we discover that, for Husserl, the Objective world is an

inherently intersubjective world, and thus, the transcendental phenomenology which once
appeared to be entirely solipsistic, leads inevitably to an intersubjective monadology.
The difficulty for Husserl is to avoid transcendental solipsism without presupposing
any metaphysical claims about other egos, particularly without simply positing the existence
of a plurality of monads. Husserl explicitly maintains that his theory does not rely on some
unacknowledged and problematic Leibnizian metaphysics that accounts for the apparent
convergence of the various perspectives on the world.

The transcendental problem of

solipsism is, for Husserl, a constitutional problem to be answered by phenomenological
analysis.

It is not a problem to be answered by metaphysical speculation.

Any

“metaphysical results” that phenomenological analysis might yield should be interpreted as
minimally metaphysical. They are clarifications of and limitations on the legitimate meaning
of the being-sense of the Objective world and other subjects, both of which are constituted by
consciousness, in terms of the epistemic conditions of the possibility of experiencing and
accepting objects with such being-senses. These results should not be interpreted as positive
metaphysical claims about the existence of a world that exists in-itself or the aseity of other
egos in any traditional sense. Reading Husserl in this way might lead to some difficulties,
but there should be no doubt that this is the way in which he intended for his work, including
the ‘Fifth Meditation,’ to be read. 60
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Husserl, CM, p.105 <135>.
Husserl himself believes that transcendental solipsism is just as much nonsense as traditional solipsism, and
that a transcendental theory of empathy is the key to resolving the problem. He writes: „Ein solipsismus, der
sagt: Ich, das seelische Wesen, bin allein alles andere ist bloss Phänomen - ist Unsinn. Ich setzt Nicht-ich Leib
und Ding voraus, Ich im naturlichen Sinn ist Person.
Aber auch die Abwandlung des Solipsismus ins Transzendentale, die schon die korrekte Scheidung
zwischen Ich und tranzendentaler Subjektivität macht und die meint, die phänomenologishce Reduktion und die
transzendentale Interpretation der Natur hebe jede mögliche Setzung fremder Subjektivität, auch
transzendentaler, auf, ist Unsinn. Die transzendentale Deutung der Einfühlung ergibt den sich rechtfertigenden
Uebergang in fremde Subjektivität, und dabei in die transzendentale. So, wie ich in meiner transzendentalen
Subjektivität nicht nur rechtmässige Erinnerung, rechtmässige Erwartung, assoziative Vordeutung,
Vergegenwärtigung
habe, so auch eine auf demselben Recht fussende Vergegenwärtigung von
transzendentalem Bewusstsein - als Einfühlung.“ (Husserl, EP II, p.496-497.)
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1.3 Husserlian monads: The transcendental ego versus the ego in its full concreteness
This transcendental ego, taken in its “full concreteness,” Husserl calls a monad. 61 While
Husserl consciously chooses this Leibnizian term, it is important to distinguish the
Leibnizian conception of monads from the Husserlian one. We might also wonder when and
why Husserl adopts this term in the first place, rather than sticking to the language of
transcendental idealism we find in Kant and Fichte. Along with Husserl’s adoption of
Cartesian terms, this only adds to confusions between how we are to understand the
relationship between transcendental phenomenology and the problem of solipsism. In what
follows, I will offer some historical comments that might help to clear up the issues
surrounding Husserl’s motivations for returning to Leibniz, and then move to more
philosophical details concerning the meaning of the term ‘monad’ in Husserl’s writings. In
doing so, I will attempt to purge some of the unnecessary metaphysical baggage that one
might think is imported into Husserl’s philosophy along with the term.
While Husserl explicitly borrows terms and concepts from Leibniz in his works,
Husserl is not concerned with properly interpreting the writings of Leibniz. As he does with
the work of a number of thinkers, Husserl appropriates Leibniz by giving a
phenomenological interpretation of his philosophy. 62 If this happens to shed new light on
Leibniz, then it is simply by chance. 63

Calling Husserl a Leibnizian, or even a neo-

Leibnizian, would be altogether misleading. 64

61

That said, along with Berkeley and

Husserl, CM, p.67-68 <102>. In text from 1921, Husserl also equates “my pure ego” with “my pure monad.”
(Husserl, Hua XXXVI, p.176) See also A.D. Smith, Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations, p.108-113.
62
The project of translating Leibniz into the language of phenomenology was taken up literally by Husserl’s
former student Dietrich Mahnke. In 1917, without the prior knowledge of Husserl, Mahnke published Eine
Neue Monadologie; a paragraph by paragraph “translation” of Leibniz’s Monadology into the language of
Husserl and Lotze. (Mahnke, Eine Neue Monadologie, p.3). Husserl received a copy of the work [BP 168] in
June of 1917, but did not read it thoroughly until the spring of 1919. (Husserl, Briefwechsel, Bd.3, p.422.) In a
letter to Husserl dated 3 March, 1932, Mahnke mentions that reading the Cartesian Meditations inspired him to
begin reworking Eine Neue Monadologie. The ‘Fourth’ and ‘Fifth Meditation’ were to serve as the basis for
this reworking, and he expressed to Husserl that he hoped that the German edition of the CM would go into
matters in more detail. (Husserl, Briefwechsel, Bd.3, p.480-481) Unfortunately, there is no working manuscript
for this second attempt at a “new monadology” in Mahnke’s Nachlass at Marburg.
63
Perhaps it is useful here to consider Husserl’s remarks on the “pre-cursors” of phenomenology from Ideas III,
§10. Here Husserl warns that even though he draws on historical figures, sometimes intentionally other times
maybe not, we should not confuse Husserl’s project with theirs. We find similar remarks in Formal and
Transcendental Logic and the Crisis writings.
64
Husserl writes to Mahnke on 27 December, 1927 that this intersubjective phenomenology is a concrete
scientific elaboration of Leibniz’s monadology. (Husserl, Briefwechsel, Bd.3, p.460) He continues by stating
that he is a “Leibnizian” in the sense that “research into the possible always precedes research of the actual –
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Schopenhauer, 65 Husserl admits that Leibniz was one of his early philosophical influences.66
This fact is not only reflected in Husserl’s early writings on the philosophy of logic and
mathematics, but in his mature writings as well. Beginning in 1908, Husserl writes of the
relationship between consciousness and the constitution of the shared, and harmoniously
perceived, world in terms of Leibnizian monads. 67
The ‘Fourth Meditation’ begins with Husserl stating that, “Objects exist for me, and
are for me what they are, only as objects of actual and possible consciousness.” 68 The task of
the phenomenologist is then to give an account of what this concrete existence-for-me and
existence-as-such [Für-mich-sein und So-sein] consists in, what sort of actual and possible
consciousness is at play here, what we mean here by possibility, what the structure of
consciousness is in relation to its objects, and so on, by way of systematic intentional
analysis. Following this, Husserl writes that, “the transcendental ego...is what it is solely in
relation to intentional objectivities,” which include not only those objects which I
immanently experience, but also “world Objects, which are shown to be existent only in his
inadequate, merely presumptive, external experience.” 69 An essential property of the ego is
to have within itself harmonious complexes of intentionality which are in part actualized in
the stream of experience, and which also in part exist as fixed potentialities which are always
already available but yet to uncovered. Every Object, i.e., spatio-temporal object, that exists
for me is nothing more than the experiential correlate of such intentional complexes, and
these complexes are in some sense a priori structures of consciousness. Husserl defines the
transcendental ego here in terms of its relation to intentional objects or, more precisely, the

that is, understood as rigorous science.” (Husserl, Briefwechsel, Bd.3, p.461) According to Husserl, a study of
the conditions of possible experience, and thus of the possible objects experience, by way of a transcendentalphenomenological (intersubjective) monadology must precede any empirical inquiry. So while Husserl
considers himself a Leibnizian in some sense, I contend that it is misnomer.
65
Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink, p.47.
66
„Ihre Liebe zu Leibniz kann ich sehr wohl nach verstehen. In jungen Jahren habe ich mit offenen Augen
öfters in der Erdmann-Ausgabe von Leibniz gelesen und zweifellos hat das auf mich...stark gewirkt.“ (Husserl,
Briefwechsel, Bd.3, p.407.) The text Husserl is referring to is likely, God. Guil. Leibnitti Opera Philosophica
quae exstant Latina Gallica Germanica omnia (1839-40) [BQ 252]. He would have read this work circa 1890.
(Schuhmann, Husserl-Chronik, p.25-26)
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intentional structures which condition all possible cognition. Intentional objects are not
transcendent things-in-themselves which consciousness apprehends, but rather the
constitutional achievement of intentional consciousness. But this ego is also a concrete ego
defined in terms of the actualization of these potentialities and its actual relation to
intentional objects, that is, it is an ego defined in terms of its activity.
In addition to the ego’s existence in relation to the intentional objects which it
constitutes in experience, the ego is also “existent for itself in continuous evidence; thus in
itself, [the ego] is continuously constituting itself as existing.” 70

Husserl calls this the

doctrine of transcendental self-constitution. The ego grasps itself not only as a flowing
cogito, but as the I which persists throughout this flow. The unity of experience over time
points to an identical and enduring subject of these experiences; “the identical Ego, who, as
the active and affected subject of consciousness, lives in all the processes of consciousness
and is related, through them, to all object-poles.” 71 Husserl insists that the transcendental
ego, this “monadic nexus of consciousness,” 72 is not an “empty pole of identity” any more
than the objects of consciousness are empty. 73 With each act of consciousness, the ego takes
on a new abiding property. I determine myself as this particular ego with each act of
consciousness. The ego is therefore both the identical pole of consciousness and the identical
substrate of ego properties.
From the ego considered as identical pole and as substrate of ego properties, we can
distinguish, “the ego taken in full its concreteness,” that is, the ego taken along with all of the
objects which are meant in its intentional life, without which it cannot be concrete. “The
ego, taken in full concreteness, we propose to call by the Leibnizian name: monad.” 74
According to Husserl, the concrete ego, or monad, has a surrounding world which
continually exists “for me” and is made up of objects which I constitute and which I thereby
have a unique “perspective” on. The pure ego and the concrete ego are the same ego
considered in two different ways: first purely as the ego which constitutes all objects and
itself, the absolute subject of all possible cognition, second as the unity of those possible acts
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of consciousness which it (actively or passively) actualizes, including the intentional
correlates of those acts. Husserl makes similar points in Ideas II:
All data of consciousness, levels of consciousness, and noetic forms which
‘can be accompanied’ by the identical Ego of an actual or possible ‘I think’
belong to a monad. Now within the absolute stream of consciousness of a
monad, certain formations of unity occur, but ones which are thoroughly
different from the intentional unity of the real Ego and its properties. To those
formations belong unities such as the persistent ‘opinions’ of one and the same
subject...to the pure Ego. The identity of the pure Ego does not only reside in
the fact that I (sc. the pure Ego), with regard to each and every cogito, can
grasp myself as the identical Ego of the cogito; rather, I am even therein and a
priori the same Ego insofar as I, in taking a position, necessarily exercise
consistency in a determinate sense: each ‘new’ position-taking institutes a
persistent ‘opinion’ or a thema (a thema of experience, of judgment, of
enjoyment, of will, etc.) so that, from now on, as often as I grasp myself as the
same as I used to be or as the same as I now am and earlier was, I also retain
my themata, assume them as active themata, just as I had posited them
previously. 75
As the subject constitutes itself as itself in time, the ego takes on certain abiding properties
according to the law of “transcendental generation.” The transcendental ego “contains” an
infinite number of possible perspectives, but it takes on only one concrete unity of these
perspectives, and this unity actively persists and accumulates through the lived stream of
consciousness, insofar as I identify myself as myself. 76
After giving a rough definition of what he means by the term monad, Husserl goes on
to explain that pure phenomenology is a transcendental monadology. He writes: “Since the
monadically concrete ego includes also the whole of actual and potential conscious life, it is
clear that the problem of explicating this monadic ego phenomenologically…must include all
constitutional problems without exception.” 77 By way of the transcendental reduction, the
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Husserl, Ideas II, p.118-119 <111-112>.
“All unities of duration which are built up in the continuous flux of immanent time merge into the unity of the
monadic stream of consciousness which is constantly becoming and changing, together with the concomitant
pure Ego. Thereby, this pure Ego is established by means of a cogito determined in any way whatsoever. It
extends itself therein onto the total sphere of what is, in the sense of ideal possibility, absolutely immanently
experienceable by it, rememberable, expectable, and indeed even phantasizable, according to all temporal
modes...Consequently, the idea, not only of the actual world posited by me but also of each and every possible
and phantasizable world, as a world for this pure Ego, has, precisely through the relation to the actual pure Ego,
fixed bounds.” (Husserl, Ideas II, p.127 <120>)
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meditating philosopher is led back to the transcendental subject and its concrete-monadic
contents. Husserl insists that his investigations are concerned not with my particular ego, but
“with apperceptive forms, with modes of consciousness that are conceived so generally that
they must belong to the make-up of every monad (e.g., perception, memory, etc.).” 78 Pure
phenomenology studies the concrete monad and argues from its concrete contents to “a
purely possible ego, a pure possibility variant of my de facto ego.” 79 It is nothing other than
the uncovering of the “transcendental ego as such, which comprises all pure possibilityvariants of my de facto ego and this ego itself qua possibility.” 80

Husserl states that

transcendental-phenomenological idealism thus reveals itself as “a transcendental and
phenomenological monadology, one which is not a metaphysical construction, but a
systematic explanation of the meaning that the world has for all of us prior to any
philosophizing.” 81 Transcendental phenomenology therefore presents itself as a solipsistic
science, but this no more entails metaphysical solipsism than mathematics, which is also a
solipsistic science, does. The question is whether or not, from its solipsistic stand-point,
transcendental phenomenology can give an account of how within my monadic ego I
constitute an intersubjective world that is there for everyone, a world that is the same for
everyone, and which I co-constitute with other subjects. It must also explain how I constitute
an open plurality of other subjects within my monad. Husserl’s explanation to this comes in
the form of his transcendental theory of empathy.
1.4 The proposed “metaphysical conclusions” of the Cartesian Meditations
According to A.D. Smith, in CM §40-41, 56, and 60 we find Husserl drawing explicitly
metaphysical conclusions. 82 These are the sections of the CM where Husserl identifies
transcendental phenomenology as transcendental idealism, where he discusses the “higher
levels” of intersubjectivity, and where he summarizes the “metaphysical results” of his
monadology respectively. 83 It should be clear given what has already been argued herein that
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Moran points to similar passages in Hua XV (Moran, Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology, p.12,
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Smith is wrong regarding the final two sections of the ‘Fourth Meditation’ when Husserl
states that phenomenology is itself nothing other than transcendental idealism.
Transcendental idealism is not a metaphysical position. To claim otherwise is to have missed
the sense of transcendental philosophy entirely. Explaining away the metaphysical import of
the other section mentioned by Smith is, however, not as straightforward.
In CM §56, Husserl argues that only the lowest level of considerations pertaining to
transcendental intersubjectivity have been explained by the analysis of the constitution of an
Objective and of other subjects by way of empathy. Here Husserl stresses the point that “the
only conceivable manner in which others can have for me the sense and status of existent
others, thus and so determined, consists in their being constituted in me as others.” 84 Others
do indeed “exist,” but the sense of this existence is nothing beyond how they are constituted
by consciousness. They are constituted by me as other monads that exist in common with
my monad, but that are not inherent parts of my monad. 85 Those familiar with Husserl’s
writing on intersubjectivity will see nothing new in this.
Smith takes Husserl to be arguing that what emerges at this stage of
phenomenological analysis as “absolute reality is not my transcendental ego, but
transcendental intersubjectivity. This is, concretely, ‘an open community of monads’ (158),
and it is this that constitutes the objective, only truly real, world.” 86 This is a strange reading
of what Husserl writes in this section.

Husserl’s argument is that in my monadic

consciousness I constitute myself and others as being part of a community. We exist in a
mutually shared Objective world. While each of us constitutes within our monad a unique
perspective on this world, we all constitute the same world. In a sense, the existence of an
actual community of other subjects, which are concretely constituted in my consciousness,
makes possible the actual Objective world of things and humans. If it were not for actual
other subjects, that is, if I could possibly constitute other subjects but never did, then there

not be construed as metaphysical (Moran, Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology, p.229-230). He says
little here about the metaphysical import of the remainder of the ‘Fifth Meditation.’
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would be no world which I would experience as for us, but only a world for me. But this is
not a metaphysical claim about the existence in-themselves of other egos or the world. This
is simply an explication of the conditions of the possibility of experiencing or of constituting
an Objective world.
When Husserl asserts that the actual existence of other subjects is necessary for the
constitution of the actual Objective world, he is not claiming that other subjects exist inthemselves. His claim is that those things which I actually constitute in my consciousness as
other psycho-physical subjects are necessary in order for me to also constitute the spatiotemporal world as the actual Objective world. If I did not constitute an actual community of
other subjects, and if I did not constitute them as being subjects like myself who constitute
the world for them and themselves in it, then I could not constitute the actual Objective
world. This is not a simple argument, but it is not a metaphysical one. 87 Smith is not alone
in his confusion. Dermot Moran also discusses the “metaphysical conclusions” of Husserl’s
mature philosophy. He writes that, for Husserl:
Really possible entities require correlation with an actual existing subject (36:
113ff). In a text from 1914-15 Husserl goes further: a material world is
thinkable only as a psychophysical world, containing something like human
modes of being in it (36: 138). Indeed, transcendental idealism requires that
the world of real being be known not just by a subject as such, but by an
embodied subjectivity (eine leibliche Subjektivität; 36: 132). Furthermore all
worlds must relate to this world. There cannot a priori be separated
individuals in their own world; all worlds are variants of this world; all
subjects belong to the one community of subjects. These are very strong
metaphysical claims, and Husserl is aware of the difficulties they pose. 88
These passages from the Husserliana volume on Transzendentaler Idealismus are certainly
parallel to parts of the ‘Fifth Meditation’, and it is just as misguided to take Husserl’s
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Husserl explains this in CM §49: “The Objective world as an idea – the ideal correlate of an intersubjective
(intersubjectively communalized) experience, which ideally can be and is carried on as constantly harmonious –
is essentially related to intersubjectivity (itself constituted as having the ideality of endless openness), whose
component particular subjects are equipped with mutually corresponding and harmonious constitutive systems.
Consequently the constitution of the world essentially involves a ‘harmony’ of the monads: precisely this
harmony among particular constitutions in the particular monads; and accordingly it involves also a harmonious
generation that goes on in each particular monad. That is not meant, however, as a ‘metaphysical’
hypothesizing of monadic harmony, any more than the monads themselves are metaphysical inventions or
hypotheses. On the contrary, it is itself part of the explication of the intentional components implicit in the fact
of the experiential world that exists for us.” (Husserl, CM, p.107-108 <138>)
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statements about the actual existence of other subjects and the world as having metaphysical
import in these texts as it is in the case of the CM. While the actual existence of other
embodied egos is necessary for the constitution of the actual world, this “actual existence” is
not equivalent to existence in-itself in the traditional metaphysical sense.

The aim of

transcendental phenomenology is to explain this being-sense without presupposing or making
any metaphysical claims. Whether or not Husserl’s project is successful or convincing is
another question.
In addition, Smith argues that Husserl not only admits a connection between his own
metaphysical scheme and Leibniz’s monadology, but that when Husserl eschews the
accusation that his philosophy avoids solipsism by adopting Leibnizian metaphysics, it is not
metaphysics that Husserl is distancing himself from, but the accusation that his metaphysics
is simply dogmatic. Smith writes:
Husserl had rejected the accusation that in the final meditation he escapes
solipsism only by ‘an unacknowledged metaphysics, a concealed adoption of
Leibnizian traditions’ (174). According to Husserl…this accusation fails to
stick, not because his own final position fails to be discernibly Leibnizian in
character (otherwise, why the ‘deliberate suggestions’?), but because his is not
simply an ‘adopted’ metaphysics, but one that ‘draws its content purely from
phenomenological explication of the transcendental experience laid open by
transcendental reduction’ (176-7). The Leibnizian metaphysics has, Husserl
believes, been earned phenomenologically. Indeed, he says elsewhere that
‘phenomenology leads to the monadology that Leibniz anticipated with an
aperçu of genius’ (EP II, 190). 89
Smith has taken Husserl’s adoption of Leibnizian language too strongly. Husserl is no more
a Leibnizian than Kant is, as I have argued above. If we took every deliberate reference
Husserl makes to a metaphysical concept found in an earlier philosopher as an outright
endorsement of their metaphysics, then Husserl would not only be a Leibnizian, but a
Cartesian, a Berkeleyan, and so on. The reason for the references to monads is not because
Husserl agrees with Leibnizian metaphysics, but because he agrees with a basic
characterization of consciousness that Leibniz gives. This is that the subject is a single,
unitary I defined by its activity, with certain “innate” potentialities. Husserl wants to explain
consciousness phenomenologically, but in doing so he is not committed to defending or
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endorsing the metaphysical elements of Leibniz’s monadology. To claim that what Husserl
is doing here is using phenomenology to prove the metaphysical claims characteristic of
Leibnizian idealism in order to resolve the problem of solipsism is simply false. 90
One important difference between Husserlian and Leibnizian monads, is that Husserl
states time and again that monads have windows. These are not windows that allow for the
mental states of others to somehow enter into my monad, but windows of empathy.91
Husserl writes:
Monads are not isolated, they have windows, that is windows for subjective
influences, that of course are of the type of the effects referred to as
spiritual...On the other hand monads have no windows insofar as nothing
which is a mental process [Erlebnis] of a subject, acts, data of sensation, etc.,
can enter into another monad. 92
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Not only is Smith’s metaphysical reading inconsistent with the problematic established in the Fourth and
Fifth Meditations, it does not fit with what Husserl says at CM §62. Husserl writes, “at the beginning I, the
meditator, do not understand how I shall ever attain others and myself <as one among others >, since all other
men are ‘parenthesized.’ At bottom moreover I do not yet understand, and I recognize only reluctantly, that,
when I ‘parenthesize’ myself qua man and qua human person, I myself am nevertheless to be retained qua ego.
Thus I can as yet know nothing about a transcendental intersubjectivity; involutarily I take myself, the ego, to
be a solus ipse and still regard all constitutional components as merely contents of this one ego, even after I
have acquired an initial understanding of constitutive performances. The further explications made in the [Fifth
Meditation] were therefore necessary. Thanks to them, the full and proper sense of phenomenological
transcendental ‘idealism’ becomes understandable to us for the first time. The illusion of solipsism is
dissolved, even though the proposition that everything existing for me must derive its existential sense
exclusively from me myself, from my sphere of consciousness retains its validity and fundamental importance.
Phenomenological transcendental idealism has presented itself as a monadology, which, despite all our
deliberate suggestions of Leibniz’s metaphysics, draws its content purely from phenomenological explication of
the transcendental experience laid open by transcendental reduction, accordingly from the most originary
evidence, wherein all conceivable evidences must be grounded or from the most originary legitimacy, which is
the source of all legitimacies and, in particular, all legitimacies of knowledge. Actually, therefore,
phenomenological explication is nothing like ‘metaphysical construction’; and it is neither overtly nor covertly
a theorizing with adopted presuppositions or helpful thoughts drawn from the historical metaphysical tradition.
It stands in sharpest contrast to all that...” (Husserl, CM, p.150 <176-177>)
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to exist in community with me is, Husserl says, for them to be ‘in connection with me’ (157)…None of this, of
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question here is ‘irreal’ or intentional. I am affected by the other in virtue of the sense of another and of his
particular achievements being constituted in my transcendental ego as something co-constituted. Although the
transcendental community is constituted in me, it is constituted ‘as a community constituted also in every other
monad’ (158).” (Smith, Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations, p.232-234) However, Smith again applies a
metaphysical interpretation to this theory such that Husserl is intending to prove or posit the necessary existence
in-themselves of other egos.
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Every ‘I’ is for itself...Every ‘I’ is a ‘monad’. But monads have windows.
They have no windows or doors insofar as no other subject can really enter
into them, but through these (the windows are of empathy) [other subjects]
may be experienced how past personal experiences are by remembering. 93
A monad also has windows, to accommodate foreign influences. These are
windows of empathy. 94
Every stream of consciousness is something entirely separate, a monad, and it
would remain without windows of understanding if not for intersubjective
phenomena, etc. This is the condition of the possibility of a world of things,
which is one and the same for many egos. 95
Perhaps Husserl and Leibniz are not be so far apart with respect to the idea that monads have
“windows” for communication, or what Leibniz refers to as resonance, but determining this
would require a detailed look at the historical connections between Leibniz and Husserl, and
the evolution of empathy theories through nineteenth century German psychology. This will

und somit ist auch eine Individualpsychologie als Psychologie eines solchen möglichen solus ipse denkbar.
Aber eine Individualpsychologie des Menschen in der Menschen- und Tierwelt und des Tieres in der Tier- und
Menschenwelt ist ein nonsens. Ihre Idee setzt voraus, wie vorhin gesagt, dass man eine Seele zu einer
abgeschlossenen Monade macht, deren Lebenszusammenhang ein in sich real abgeschlossener Zusammenhang
ist derart, dass keine realen Beziehungen, und zwar von der eigenwesentlichen Gestalt der
Motivationsbeziehungen, zwischen ihr und anderen Monaden gestiftet sein könnten. Dann hat man aber den
Widersinn, dass man auf der einen Seite in der Erfahrungswelt Freundschaften, Liebschaften, Vereine, Völker,
Staaten usw. hat und demgernäss beständig über sie Aussagen macht, die den Anspruch einer vernünftigen
Erfahrungswahrheit erheben, und dass man andererseits jeden Menschen zu einem solus ipse macht, zu einem
Solipsisten mitten in der lebendigen Gemeinschaftswirklichkeit. Leibniz sagte, Monaden haben keine Fenster.
Ich aber meine, jede Seelenmonade hat unendlich viele Fenster, nämlich jede verständnisvolle Wahrnehmung
eines fremden Leibes ist solch ein Fenster, und jedesmal, wenn ich sage, bitte, lieber Freund, und er antwortet
mir verständnisvoll, ist aus unseren offenen Fenstern ein Ichakt meines Ich in das Freundes-Ich übergegangen
und umgekehrt, eine wechselseitige Motivation hat zwischen uns eine reale Einheit, ja wirklich eine reale
Einheit hergestellt. Und die Liebe dringt wirklich von Seele zu Seele, und im Befehl wirkt ernstlich und
unmittelbar der eine Wille auf den anderen, fremden Willen, bzw. wirkt das eine Willenssubjekt auf das andere.
Schon wenn ich ein Ding sehe, so ist es die einzig richtige Rede zu sagen, das Ding ist in unmittelbarer
Beziehung zu mir, und in realer Beziehung, die einzig unmittelbare psychische Beziehung, die es zu ihm von
mir aus gibt.“ (Hua XIII, p.472-473)
93
„Jedes Ich ist für sich...Jede Ich Ist eine „Monade“. Aber die Monaden haben Fenster. Sie haben insofern
keine Fenster oder Türen, als kein anderes Subjekt reell eintreten kann, aber durch die hindurch es (die Fenster
sind die Einfühlungen) so gut erfahren sein kann wie vergangene eigene Erlebnisse durch Wiedererinnerung.“
(Husserl, Hua XIV, p.260)
94
„Eine Monade hat also Fenster, um fremde Einwirkungen aufzunehmen. Es sind die Fenster der
Einfühlung.“ (Husserl, Hua XIV, p.295)
95
„Jeder Bewusstseinsablauf ist etwas völlig Gesondertes, eine Monade, und sie bliebe ohne Fenster der
Verständigung, wenn nicht intersubjektive Phänomene da wären etc. Das ist denn auch die Bedingung der
Möglichkeit einer Dingwelt, die eine und dieselbe ist für viele Ich.“ (Husserl, Hua XIII, p.230)
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not concern us here. All we need to point out is that while the use of Leibnizian language is
misleading here, as is the reference to windows insofar as they conjure up ideas about
monads existing in space and casual influences, Husserl is clear that these “windows” of
empathy which monads have are conditions of the possibility of the experience of an
Objective world. These are transcendental-epistemological claims, not metaphysical ones.
In the ‘Fifth Mediation,’ Husserl himself mentions that he has uncovered some
“extremely important metaphysical results.” 96 This would make Husserl partially to blame
for the confusion over how to interpret his transcendental idealism, if not for that fact that
just before writing this, as was mentioned at the beginning of the present paper, he also
points out that:
Our monadological results are metaphysical, if it be true that ultimate
cognitions of being should be called metaphysical. On the other hand, what
we have here is anything but metaphysics in the customary
sense…Phenomenology’s purely intuitive, concrete, and also apodictic mode
of demonstration excludes all ‘metaphysical adventure’, all speculative
excesses. 97
It seems clear enough that what some commentators have referred to as “phenomenological
metaphysics” is not metaphysics in any customary sense. To be more precise, it is not
metaphysics at all, rather, it is transcendental philosophy, which concerns itself not with
being in-itself, but with the conditions of the possibility of the cognition of being. For
Husserl, this is the only legitimate sense there can be of a science of “being qua being” –
anything else is dogmatic, speculative, and unscientific.
Husserl summarizes his “metaphysical results” as follows. First, he states that, “a
priori, my ego, given to me apodictically” is the only thing that I can posit as existing with
certainty. 98 Second, he notes that this ego can only be a world-experiencing ego by being in
communion with other subjects like myself. That is, in order to experience the Objective
world, I must be “a member of a community of monads.” 99 At the same time, Husserl argues
that, “I cannot conceive a plurality of monads otherwise than as explicitly or implicitly in
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communion.” 100 These are not claims about the existence in-themselves of worldly objects
or of other subjects, but that in order for me to constitute the external world as the Objective
lived-world, I must also constitute it as an intersubjective world which I co-constitute with
other psychophysical ego subjects like myself. Like the world, these other subjects actually
exist insofar as I constitute them in concrete experience as existing with a particular kind of
being-sense, and empathy is the condition of the possibility of this. None of this is meant to
contradict the claim that:
[The world] is for me and is what it is for me only insofar as it acquires sense
and self-confirming validity from my own pure life and from that of the others
who are disclosed to me in my own life. I, as this absolutely posited proper
essence, as the open and infinite field of pure phenomenological givens and as
their inseparable unity, am the ‘transcendental Ego.’ Absolute positing means
that I no longer have the world as ‘given’ to me in advance or with the status
of straightforward existence. Instead, from now on what is exclusively given
(as a result of my new attitude) is my Ego purely as the Ego that exists in itself
and that in itself experiences the world, verifies it, etc. 101
Even though the world is an intersubjective and co-constituted world, the world for me still
receives its entire being-sense from my experiencing ego and can still be explained entirely
by reference to the actual and potential performances of my ego. 102
Husserl goes on to explain that it is incompossible that there could be two or more
monads that constitute within experience their own private worlds such that together they
constitute two entirely separate spatio-temporal, Objective worlds.

Husserl argues that,

“there can exist only one Objective world, only one Objective time, only one Objective
space, only one Objective Nature. Moreover this one Nature must exist, if there are any
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There is a somewhat confusing passage in the ‘Fifth Meditation’ with respect to the existence in-itself of the
external world that reads as follows: “within myself, within the limits of my transcendentally reduced pure
conscious life, I experience the world (including others) and, according to its experiential sense, not as (so to
speak) my private synthetic formation but as other than mine alone [mir fremde], as an intersubjective world,
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structures in me that involve the co-existence of other monads.” 103 According to Husserl,
there can be no possible world for me other than the one actual world of experience.
Anything else is an absurdity. If these arguments are correct, then Husserl is able to avoid
the problem of solipsism without adopting any metaphysical presuppositions. In fact, the
only outright metaphysical claim he makes is that the transcendental ego necessarily exists
in-itself and for-itself, but this is a critical rather than a speculative or dogmatic metaphysical
claim.

The “metaphysical results” of the ‘Fifth Meditation’ are, at best, minimally

metaphysical. Correctly understood, they are transcendental-epistemological claims about
the conditions of experiencing or cognizing objects in the way that we do in concrete
experience. The stronger interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental idealism, particularly the
‘Fifth Meditation,’ endorsed by Smith need not and should not be accepted.

1.5 Conclusion: The Transcendental Arguments of the ‘Fifth Meditation’
In the present essay I outline and defend Husserl’s characterization of transcendental
phenomenology as metaphysically neutral. I have argued that, for Husserl, metaphysical
neutrality is an intrinsic limit on the legitimate scope of transcendental phenomenology. This
does not mean that transcendental phenomenology has no metaphysical implications, but that
it refrains from making any speculative metaphysical claims.

According to Husserl,

transcendental phenomenology is, “nothing more than scientific self-examination on the part
of transcendental subjectivity,” 104 which aims to clarify the conditions and essence of all
possible cognition in general, or how all possible and actual phenomena are constituted in
and by consciousness. The only metaphysical claim that Husserl seems committed to is that
the transcendental ego exists in-itself and for-itself. However, this is not a presupposition of
his theory but a critical result which Husserl believes is sufficiently demonstrated not only by
the phenomenological reduction and the unity of apperception. It seems that, aside from the
absolute existence of the transcendental ego, all other metaphysical claims can be discarded
from our readings of Husserl. If we attempt to interpret Husserl’s phenomenology along
metaphysical rather than transcendental-epistemological lines, then we cannot make good on
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the claim that, “Phenomenology is the first rigorous scientific form of philosophical
idealism.” 105
As a scientific self-examination on the part of the transcendental subject,
transcendental phenomenology may be characterized as a monadology. Yet the results of
Husserl’s monadology differ greatly from the ones we find in the work of Leibniz. Using
metaphysical neutrality as an interpretive tool, I have argued that Husserl’s intersubjective
monadology, which he presents as a response to the threat of solipsism, should not be read as
an attempt to demonstrate either the existence of other subjects in-themselves or the
existence in-itself of the external world. Such a reading is incompatible with the way in
which Husserl frames the question, and with the entire project of transcendental
phenomenology as it is presented throughout Husserl’s mature writings. As Zahavi notes,
Husserl’s transcendental idealism “shows that both metaphysical realism and idealism,
together with a lot of traditional metaphysical heritage, are strictly speaking nonsensical.”106
If phenomenology is able to shed additional light on traditional metaphysical problems, it
does so by showing that such problems are the result of equivocations and paralogisms.
Equally important is the fact that Husserl wants to show that such proofs are not necessary
for thwarting the challenge of solipsism that is typically used by realists to disarm
transcendental idealism. I have also attempted to explain Husserl’s novel conception of
monads, although I have not given a complete account of this. The take home point is that
Husserl is not a Leibnizian, at least not in any ordinary sense. Most importantly, Husserl
neither presupposes nor defends a Leibnizian metaphysics.
The present essay certainly suggests more than it brings to completion, especially by
way of providing an interpretation and defense of Husserl’s transcendental idealism.
However, giving a complete interpretation and defense of Husserl was not my goal. Nor is
this essay meant to be an attempt at the arduous task of giving a line-by-line interpretation of
the ‘Fifth Meditation.’ The task here was a more modest one, but one which I take to be
extremely important.

My ambition was to argue for and sketch a tenable interpretive

framework for reading Husserl within which more detailed analyses of his texts can be
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accomplished.

This requires that we understand the spirit of Husserl’s transcendental

idealism and his monadology. The virtue of my interpretive framework is that it makes the
‘Fifth Meditation’ consistent with Husserl’s overall project of transcendental idealism, with
his other writing on intersubjectivity, empathy, and the problem of solipsism (with the view
that the ‘Fifth Meditation’ is the culmination of Husserl’s evolving thought on these issues).
A.D. Smith’s attempt at interpreting the ‘Fourth’ and ‘Fifth Meditation’ flounders insofar as
it forces a metaphysical reading of Husserl that we need not and ought not accept.
Husserl’s argument regarding the constitution of the Objective world and of other
subjects can be summarized as follows.

Possible other subjects are necessary for the

experience of an Objective world in general. All possible Objects are constituted not just as
being for me, but as being for everyone, that is, they are intersubjective. 107 Actual other
subjects are necessary for the constitution of the actual Objective, shared world. Empathy is
the condition of the possibility of the experience of actual other subjects, that is, of
constituting certain things as having Seelenlebens distinct from my own. However, empathy
does not allow me to directly experience the mental-lives of others. Nowhere here does
Husserl attempt to demonstrate the existence in-itself of the world, or of other transcendental
egos. As Kevin Hermberg writes:
The task Husserl sought to accomplish in the Fifth Meditation, then, is an
investigation and explication of our experiences of Others, not the
metaphysical problem of proving their existence. The problem is “a special
one, namely that of the ‘thereness-for-me’ of others, [a] theory of experiencing
someone else” (CM 92), but there is much more at stake than merely making
sense of the way in which Others are experienced. A theory like the one
Husserl offers as a solution to the problem of experiencing Others “contributes
to the founding of a transcendental theory of the Objective world” (CM 92).
Although the problem is, at base, the special problem of experiencing
someone else, it leads to the possibility of an Objective world. 108
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Similarly, Moran writes that: “Adopting the Kantian critical position, Husserl understood transcendental
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acting in consort...The notion of an ‘object’ is precisely the notion of something publicly accessible, something
there ‘for everyone’ (für Jedermann).” (Moran, Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology, p.56-57)
108
Kevin Hermberg, Husserl’s Phenomenology: Knowledge, Objectivity, and Others, p.49.
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There may well be passages in Husserl, even in the ‘Fifth Meditation,’ which are problematic
for this reading. I do not want to simply hide behind the fact that the Cartesian Meditations
are an unfinished work to account for this. But even in the face of such challenges, I
maintain that the reading I have pushed should be utilized for interpreting Husserl. The
principle of charity requires no more and no less than this. From there, the goal of the
commentator can be either one of criticism or apologetics, but neither of these should
influence our initial reading of the text.
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2

The World “for me” and the World “for everyone”: the
Problem of Solipsism in Husserl’s Formal and
Transcendental Logic

Research into the problems of intersubjectivity, Objectivity, and solipsism in Husserl’s
philosophy has traditionally focused on his Cartesian Meditations. 1 In the ‘Fifth Meditation,’
Husserl outlines his intersubjective monadology, and attempts to show the connection
between a transcendental theory of experiencing someone else, and a transcendental theory of
the Objective world. 2

The purpose of this is to refute the claim that transcendental

phenomenology leads to solipsism. However, the analyses laid out in the ‘Fifth Meditation’
are incomplete and notoriously difficult to interpret. 3

Strangely, commentators have

overlooked a set of related passages from the Formal and Transcendental Logic, 4 namely
§§94-99 and §§102-104, which deal with the same set of problems. In what follows, I will
show that these passages on intersubjectivity, Objectivity, and solipsism from the FTL
provide an important interpretive framework that ought to be utilized when assessing the
content of the ‘Fifth Meditation.’ Not only are the arguments in the FTL much easier to
navigate, they supplement the analyses of the ‘Fifth Meditation’ and they justify adopting an
“epistemological” interpretation of transcendental phenomenology. That is to say, in FTL
Husserl’s phenomenology is not presented as a metaphysical or psychological theory, but a
transcendental theory concerning the conditions of the possibility of cognition or the
“constitutional apriori.” 5 I contend that reading the CM in light of the FTL (rather than the
other way around) helps to deflate the metaphysical language of the ‘Fifth Meditation,’ and
that the “epistemological” interpretation of Husserl is to be preferred.

1

Hereafter abbreviated as CM.
Edmund Husserl, CM, p.90-92 <123-124>.
3
Dissatisfied with the CM, Husserl began work on the so-called “German Meditations” and his “System of
Phenomenological Philosophy” – the outline for which can be found in Bob Sandmeyer’s Husserl’s Constitutive
Phenomenology (2009), p.178-186. His assistant Eugen Fink was left with the task of revamping the CM, a task
which included reworking the ‘Fifth Meditation’ and the writing of two entirely new meditations to be added to
the end of the work. None of these projects were ever completed.
4
Hereafter abbreviated as FTL. Peter Hutcheson makes use of some of these passages in his essay “Husserl’s
Fifth Meditation,” Man and World 15, pp.265-284 (1982).
5
Edmund Husserl, FTL, p.246 <218>
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Parts of the ‘Fifth Meditation’ appear, at least at first glance, to frustrate the
“epistemological” reading of transcendental phenomenology. For instance, there is Husserl’s
uncharacteristic remark that “the experienced world exists in itself,” 6 along with the so-called
“metaphysical results” outlined in CM §60 which scholars such as AD Smith and Dermot
Moran have pointed to as supporting the notion of a Husserlian metaphysics. 7 However,
notwithstanding the clarifications of these claims that can be found in the CM itself, the FTL
gives us valuable insight into Husserl’s special sense of Objectivity, which is at the heart of
all his “metaphysical” conclusions. Husserl defines Objectivity as being not only for me but
“for everyone” or as existing for “everyone capable of cognition.” 8 The problem Husserl
then faces is explaining what he means by “everyone” if everything that exists is constituted
in my own monad. In other words, by separating mind-independence from Objectivity,
Husserl must address the problem of solipsism.

In what follows I will first examine

Husserl’s theory of the Objective as presented in FTL §§94-96. I will then discuss how
Husserl frames the related problem of solipsism that seems to result from his commitment to
transcendental idealism, and why he identifies solipsism as a “transcendental illusion
[transzendentalen Schein].” I conclude that while Husserl is willing to admit that the monadic
ego is a solus ipse, he may still, paradoxically, avoid the threat of solipsism. In doing so, I
hope to supplement the commentaries of Suzanne Bachelard’s A Study of Husserl’s Formal
and Transcendental Logic (1957/1968), and Dieter Lohmar’s Edmund Husserls ‘Formale
und Transzendentale Logik’ (2000). 9

2.1 The Importance of Husserl’s Formal and Transcendental Logic
Dieter Lohmar notes that FTL has been relatively underutilized by scholars in
phenomenology and has attracted far less interest than the CM and The Crisis of the
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. However, FTL can and should be

6

Husserl, CM, p.91 <123>
A.D. Smith, Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations, p.200-211; Dermot Moran, Edmund Husserl: Founder of
Phenomenology, p.197. However, Moran also admits that, “There are immensely complex and vexing issues
regarding Husserl interpretation, especially the nature of his commitment to metaphysics in general and
transcendental idealism in particular.” (Moran, Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology, p.242)
8
Husserl, FTL, p.240 <213>; p.226 <200>.
9
Suzanne Bachelard, A Study of Husserl’s Formal and Transcendental Logic, p.127, 171, 180-181, 209-210,
219; Dieter Lohmar, Edmund Husserls ‘Formale und Transzendentale Logik,’ p.175-179.
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approached as laying the groundwork for the CM and Crisis, as well as to his other late
“logical work,” Experience and Judgment. 10 In particular, Part II of FTL sets the stage for
the later works, so getting a better sense of this work will help to situate Husserl’s subsequent
texts within a broader research project. 11 If this view of FTL is true, then it would follow that
in order to fully understand the FTL, we cannot claim to fully understand the CM either.
Robert Sokolowski writes:
the neglect of FTL would show that the true substance of Cartesian
Meditations and Crisis would not have been grasped…Husserl’s logical works
are not developed independently and in parallel to his more ‘existential’
books, such as Ideas I, Cartesian Meditations, and Crisis; his logical
works…are at the source of his entire philosophy. 12
There is good reason to agree with the view of Lohmar regarding the importance of the FTL.
The so-called “logical works” play a fundamental role in understanding the epistemological
and metaphysical currents that run through Husserl’s mature thought from Ideas I to the
Crisis. In fact, referring to FTL as a “logical work” masks an important difference between
the content of Part I of the book (which has to do with formal logic) and Part II (which deals
with transcendental logic). Large portions of Part II serve as the groundwork for a defense of
Husserl’s transcendental idealism. Calling FTL a “logical work” might confuse readers into
assuming that it is meant to simply be a continuation of Husserl’s earlier logical

10

There is much more that can be said regarding the important position FTL holds in Husserl’s Nachlass than
Lohmar does here. Husserl wrote the first draft of FTL in the winter of 1928/29, just before the Paris Lectures.
He made a series of corrections and added notes to the text later in 1929 at the same time as he was preparing
the manuscripts for the CM. Earlier in 1928 Husserl had made his final set of revisions to the manuscript Ideas
II; a text in which Husserl references his work on “Transcendental logic.” (See Husserl, Ideas II, p.264. This is
likely a reference to manuscript F I 38, now published in Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis.)
We might also speculate that some of the edits made after 1924 to the manuscript for The Basic Problems of
Phenomenology were made around this time as well. This was an important period for Husserl, in which he sets
out to publish works which would defend his commitment to transcendental idealism that was only implicitly
revealed in Ideas, and to tackle the criticisms that had been launched against that work. Moreover, there is
much work to be done regarding the development of FTL manuscripts.
11
„Der II. Abschnitt ist dagegen – zumindest das 4. Kapitel [2A4K] – ein detaillierter Plan für die Ausführung
der Untersuchungen von Erfahrung und Urteil. Doch selbst in dieser Funktion einer detaillierten Ankündigung
der Untersuchungen des '2. logischen Buchs' geht dieser II. Abschnitt nicht auf. Er bietet dem Leser ein weit
gefächertes Panorama an eng verbundenen genetisch-phänomenologischen Untersuchungen, das eine recht
genaue Ankündigung der systematischen Projekte des husserlschen Spätwerkes darstellt. Sowohl die zu diesem
Zeitpunkt fast fertig konzipierte deutsche Fassung der Cartesianischen Meditationen als auch die prinzipiellen
Linien des Krisis werden neben den Grundgedanken von Erfahrung und Urteil entfaltet. Man könnte also
ebenso behaupten, der II. Abschnitt von Formale und transzendentale Logik sei eine Einleitung in die drei
letzten Hauptwerke Husserls.“ (Lohmar, Edmund Husserls ‘Formale und transzendentale Logik’, p.10)
12
Sokolowski, “(Review) Dieter Lohmar, Edmund Husserls ‘Formale und transzendentale Logik’,” in Husserl
Studies 18 (2002), p.236.
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investigations, and dissuade them from utilizing it in interpreting his “existential” writings.
This is regrettable since Part II of FTL helps to explain many of the more vexing parts of the
‘Fifth Meditation.’
Commenting on reasons for the neglected treatment of FTL, Sokolowski writes that
the text is, “highly condensed, almost gem-like in its precision, and it has a far more elegant
architecture than Husserl’s other works. Its compression makes it difficult to read; it is a
hard nut to crack, and scholars in phenomenology have used it far less than [other works].” 13
One reason scholars have relied on FTL far less than other works from Husserl’s mature
period can be at least partially attributed to the fact that, despite its elegance, FTL is not an
“introduction to phenomenology” like the others. 14 The result is that the work is difficult to
interpret in place. In the introduction to FTL, Husserl warns his readers of the lack of
“completeness” and “self-containedness” of Part II of the work, and claims that it is a text
that “suggests more than it carries through to a finish.” 15 Indeed, many of the analyses
Husserl begins in Part II appear to be merely sketches of explanations, or conclusions based
on analyses that are not made explicit in the text. The reason they appear this way is because
they are based on manuscripts that were not published during Husserl’s lifetime.
Unfortunately, it is in Part II where Husserl attempts to “dissolve” the problem of solipsism,
which he at one point calls “the transcendental illusion that from the outset misleads, and
usually paralyzes, any attempt to start a consistent transcendental philosophy.” 16

13

Robert Sokolowski, “(Review) Dieter Lohmar, Edmund Husserls ‘Formale und Transzendentale Logik’,”
Husserl Studies 18 (2002), p.233.
14
Anthony Steinbock contends that FTL is an introduction to phenomenology like Ideas, CM, and the Crisis.
(Anthony Steinbock, “Translator’s Intoduction,” in Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, p.xviixxiv.) However, it is unclear to me that Husserl himself considered the work an introductory one. If we think
of the analyses of the FTL as outlining Husserl’s “transcendental aesthetics,” then it is a foundational work for
Husserl’s system, but not an introduction. In the ‘Conclusion’ to FTL, Husserl writes: “‘Transcendental
aesthetics’ – in a new sense of the phrase (which we use because of an easily apprehensible relationship to
Kant’s narrowly restricted transcendental aesthetics) – functions as the ground level…It deals with the eidetic
problem of any possible world as a world given in ‘pure experience’ and thus precedes all science in the
‘higher’ sense; accordingly it undertakes the eidetic description of the all-embracing Apriori, without which no
Objects could appear unitarily…and therefore without which the unity of a Nature, the unity of a world, as a
passively synthetized unity, could not become constituted at all.” (Husserl, FTL, p.291-292 <256-257>)
15
Husserl, FTL, p.17 <15>.
16
Husserl, FTL, p.241 <213>. This may well relate to Husserl’s talk of the experience of the Other as a
“transcendental clue” for the constitutional theory of experiencing someone else, (Husserl, CM, p.90 <123>), or
his discussion of “transcendental aesthetics” and “transcendental analytics” (Husserl, CM, p.146 <173>). These
moves toward a systematic treatment of transcendental phenomenology using Kantian terminology are
interesting, but we will not explore this here in detail.
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2.2 The problem of solipsism in FTL
On 25 February, 1929, Edmund Husserl addressed his audience at the Sorbonne’s
Ampithéâtre Descartes, stating the following:
We must now deal with the one thought that is truly disturbing. If I, the
meditating “I”, reduce myself through an epoché to my absolute ego and to
that which constitutes itself therein, then, do I not become the solus ipse? Did
not then this whole philosophy of self-examination turn out to be pure
solipsism, even though a transcendental and phenomenological solipsism? 17
Since his turn to transcendental idealism circa 1905, 18 Husserl had recognized solipsism as
not only one of the recurring challenges for his phenomenology, but as one of the basic
problems of philosophy. After two days of lecturing at the Sorbonne, Husserl ended his talk
entitled Einleitung in die transzendentale Phänomenologie, with a short discussion of
solipsism and the “transcendental act of empathy.” 19

According to Husserl, a

phenomenological analysis of empathy [Einfühlung] would be necessary for addressing the
problem of solipsism along with a cluster of related difficulties surrounding his theory of
intersubjectivity. The final six pages of the Paris Lectures grow to sixty-three by the time
they become the ‘Fifth Meditation’ and ‘Conclusion’ of the CM, 20 making them the most
reworked part of the lectures.
Husserl returns to the problem of solipsism time and time again in the years between
his transcendental turn and the publication of the CM, as we see in Ideas II, Erste
Philosophie, Einleitung in die Philosophie, Transzendentale Idealismus, and the three
volume Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, to name a few. 21 He maintained that the
seeds for a resolution to the problem could be found in his lectures from the winter semester
1910/11 on The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. 22 While addressing the problem of

17

Husserl, The Paris Lectures, p.34.
Dermot Moran, Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology, p.26. While Husserl’s transcendental turn can
be traced back as far as the Seefelder Blätter (1905), he does not reveal this turn publically until 1907, as Moran
also notes.
19
Moran, Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology, p.34.
20
I am referring here to the 1931 French edition, Méditations cartésiennes, which were translated by Emmanuel
Levinas, Gabrielle Peiffer (aka Catherine Kany), under the supervision of Alexandre Koyré. However, Husserl
deemed this text inadequate.
21
See Appendix I.
22
Husserl refers to these lectures in a note added to FTL in July, 1929: “The chief points for the solution of the
problem of intersubjectivity and for the overcoming of transcendental solipsism were already developed in
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solipsism was clearly important for Husserl, the secondary literature has, for the most part,
left this problem untouched. 23 FTL is a logical place to begin a systematic treatment of this
topic given its place within Husserl’s Nachlass, and particularly when viewed as
foundational for the CM. Even though the analyses of the CM are incomplete, FTL provides
us with a framework that limits possible interpretations of those analyses and the conclusions
which would legitimately follow from them.
In the FTL, Husserl explains the problem of solipsism that threatens transcendental
phenomenology as follows: “If everything I can ever accept as existent is constituted in my
ego, then everything that exists does indeed seem to be a mere moment of my own
transcendental being.” 24

In other words, if from the transcendental-phenomenological

standpoint all that exists for me in any meaningful sense of the word is nothing beyond the
actual and potential intentional unities constituted by and inseparable from my
consciousness, including the Objective world and other egos, does this not amount to
solipsism? 25

It seems that Husserl wants to answer in the negative, but with some

qualifications. Commentators, however, have argued that Husserl’s mature thought cannot
escape solipsism. Josef Seifert writes that Husserl recognized, “that solipsism follows, or at
least seems to follow, necessarily from idealism.” 26 Seifert goes on to make the stronger
claim that solipsism follows necessarily from any form of transcendental idealism as well,
including Husserl’s, “if one does not introduce something like a general and absolute
consciousness shared by all persons or make another contradictory or untenable

lectures that I gave at Gottingen during the winter semester of 1910-11. But the actual carrying-out required
further difficult single investigations, which did not reach their conclusion until much later. (Husserl, Formal
and Transcendental Logic, p.243 <215>)
23
To date, the problem of solipsism has not received an exhaustive treatment in the secondary literature on
Husserl. It has been the theme of a small number of journal articles, and is mentioned in a number of texts on
Husserl, such as David Bell’s Husserl (1990) and Johanna Maria Tito’s Logic in the Husserlian Context (1991),
but there is no one book devoted exclusively to the problem. Works on Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity,
such as James Mensch’s Intersubjectivity and Transcendental Idealism (1988) and Natalie Depraz’s
Transcendence et incarnation: Le statut de l’intersubjectivité comme alterite a soi chez Husserl (1995), only
indirectly address the problem of solipsism.
24
Husserl, FTL, p.241 <213>
25
This is a rephrasing of what Husserl says at the beginning of the ‘Fifth Meditation.’ (Husserl, CM, p.89
<121>)
26
Josef Seifert, Discours des Méthodes, p.55.
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assumption.” 27 Before getting into the details of Husserl’s response, let us look at what he
says leading into the problem of solipsism in FTL.

2.3 The Groundlessness of Naïve Realism and the Transcendental Sense of Objectivity
In FTL §§92-93, Husserl outlines his general criticism of traditional theories of evidence and
truth. According to Husserl, these theories have uncritically presupposed that there is a
mind-independent world that exists in-itself, and that true or genuine knowledge depends on
the possibility of cognizing that world. The world of things-in-themselves is the substrate for
truths-in-themselves. In this way, Objectivity depends on a mind independent metaphysical
realm of things. Even skeptics typically rely on this presupposition, arguing that genuine
knowledge is impossible since we lack any access to or evidence of such a realm. In short,
Husserl finds that the greatest error in the history of Western philosophy is the naïve
acceptance of the very possibility of the existence of a mind-independent external world.
However, Husserl also believes that since Descartes philosophers have had the conceptual
tools with which to overcome this embarrassment, even though Descartes himself failed to do
so.

Like Schopenhauer, Husserl believes that most philosophers fail to understand

transcendental philosophy and remain, “caught in that natural and childish realism into which
we are all born, and which makes everything possible for us except philosophy.” 28
There are two profound insights that Husserl attributes to Descartes. First is the
realization of his naïve acceptance of the fundamental thesis of the natural attitude: the
existence in-itself of the external world. In the Meditations, Descartes writes that he used to
mistakenly assert that, “there were things outside me which were the sources of my ideas and
which resembled them in all respects.” 29

The Cartesian breakthrough consists of the

suspension or bracketing of the thesis of the natural attitude and the reduction to
transcendental subjectivity. Following Descartes, Husserl finds that the philosophies and

27

Josef Seifert, Discours des Méthodes, p.55.
Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation V1, p.17 <XXIV>. Husserl made extensive
annotations in each of his copies of The World as Will and Representation [BQ 419-2; BQ 420-1]. While the
passage quoted here was not one of them, the indicating the similarity between Schopenhauer and Husserl here
seems warranted.
29
Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, p.25.
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sciences of the natural attitude presuppose not only a real world’s being-in-itself but also the
possibility of cognizing and knowing, either empirically or a priori, a mind independent
external world. Husserl takes Descartes’ thought one step further. It is not merely the
acceptance of the realist thesis that is problematic, but the notion that there even can be any
meaningful sense to the type of external world that the realist posits.
The second insight of Descartes, which is hinted at above, is the uncovering of
transcendental subjectivity via his method of radical doubt. In his search for an indubitable
foundation for knowledge, Descartes concluded that the presupposition of the world must be
put out of play, and that all Objective cognition must be grounded in the absolute and
necessary existence of the ego-cogito.

For Husserl, this marks the beginning of

transcendental philosophy. 30 Sadly, Descartes failed to realize that, from the standpoint of
cognition, the ego he had uncovered “precedes the being of the world.” 31 The ego-cogito is
not some piece of the world, namely, the human psyche, from which the existence of the rest
of the world can be deduced. By identifying the transcendental ego as a mens sive animus
and a substantia cogitans, Descartes makes it a piece of the world and thus can be said to
have only partially discovered the transcendental ego. According to Husserl, Descartes falls
back into realism by making the ego a “bit of the world” instead of recognizing that the ego
constitutes both the world and itself as a human subject in the world. 32
Husserl also makes two further claims in this section that contribute to his discussion
of the problem of solipsism later on. One is the claim that transcendental phenomenology is,
essentially, a systematic science of one’s own ego. All of the problems that transcendental
philosophy can raise and answer are questions concerning the actual and potential
accomplishments of my constituting consciousness and the essential structures of
consciousness. Thus, the realm of transcendental phenomenology is restricted to
transcendental subjectivity. For Husserl, there is no “outside” of this monadic consciousness

30

Husserl, FTL, p.227 <201-202>
Husserl, FTL, p.228 <202>
32
Husserl, FTL, p.227-228 <202>. Bachelard drives this point home in her commentary: “The mens sive
animus sive intellectus is still, actually, a human ego, a natural reality, while the ego to which the transcendental
phenomenological reduction leads us is a pure ego. One does not reach the pure ego simply by abstracting from
physical reality and restricting oneself to the pure data of internal experience. Psychic life must fall before the
epoché, for it is still a natural reality.” (Bachelard, A Study of Husserl’s Formal and Transcendental Logic,
p.156-157)
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that can be the subject matter of any science. In fact, as was alluded to above, Husserl denies
that such an outside even exists.
Husserl’s second claim is to have uncovered a “new” and transcendental sense of
Objectivity. In the transcendental sense, an Object (or an Objective truth) is an object (or a
truth) that is capable of being cognized by, or is a possible object of cognition for everyone,
that is, “every human being or supposable quasi-human being in the actual world.” 33 Such
Objects are constituted in consciousness as “transcendent” intentional unities.

Husserl

intends to argue that to be an Object is to be a possible object of common cognition for every
actual cognizing subject in the world, and that such a sense of Objectivity does not depend on
the actual existence of such objects in-themselves as mind-independent metaphysical
hypostatizations. What it means for something to be an Object is that it is constituted as
being, in principle, cognizable by all other subjects like myself. Along with the rejection of
the naïve acceptance of the possibility of the existence of a mind-independent external world,
this appears to conspire to reduce transcendental phenomenology to solipsism. However,
Husserl claims that this resulting solipsism is a “transcendental illusion.”

2.4 Formal and Transcendental Logic §§94-95: The Objective World
The first sections of FTL Chapter 6 contain a dense but remarkably clear explanation of
Husserl’s theory of constitution, and a partial defense of his transcendental idealism. The
purpose of this section is to explain how it is that every existent is constituted in and by
consciousness, without lapsing into subjective idealism or transcendental realism. According
to Bachelard, in §§94-95 Husserl is attempting to show that:
all existence derives its sense and status from the transcendental ego and…this
ego is a ‘constituting’ subjectivity. But, on the other hand, while thus
connecting it to the ego, it is not necessary to dissipate the transcendent as
such and fall into a dogmatic idealism. It must be shown how what unfolds in
the immanence of my consciousness can acquire an Objective significance. 34

33
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Husserl, FTL, p.226 <200-201>
Bachelard, A Study of Husserl’s Formal and Transcendental Logic, p.158-159.
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In order to avoid both realism and idealism, Husserl begins with a critique of experience that
hopes to move past this traditional dichotomy. First Husserl argues that consciousness is not
some empty room with windows through which a world that exists prior to and independent
of experience may enter. 35 Husserl believes that the notion that we experience something that
is foreign to experience is countersensical. We never experience a state-of-affairs apart from
our experience of it, and therefore we never experience anything alien to consciousness but
always something related to consciousness, even in cases where we experience something as
being “transcendent.”
After explaining what experience is not, he offers his own positive definition. For
Husserl, experience is the act or performance by which an object of consciousness is
constituted or becomes what it is, as it is, for me. As Husserl writes, “Experience is the
performance in which for me, the experiencer, experienced being ‘is there’, and it there as
what it is, with the whole content and the mode of being that experience itself, by the
performance going on in its intentionality, attributes to it.” 36 It is in experience that objects
receive their entire being-sense, their Seinssinn. If what we experience has the sense of
“transcendent” being, then it is experience that constitutes this sense. Husserl continues:
it is again experience that says: These physical things, this world, is utterly
transcendent of me, of my own being. It is an “Objective” world,
experienceable and experienced as the same world by others too. Actuality
becomes warranted, illusion rectified, in my concourse with others – who
likewise are, for me, data of actual and possible experience. 37
If I experience some object of consciousness as “transcendent” then it is consciousness that
has constituted that object with that sense, and it is experience that tells me this. If that
object is to be part of the Objective world, and not a mere illusion, then it is experience that
tells me this also. Experience tells me that the physical things are possible objects of
experience for myself in the future from different perspectives, and possible objects of
experience for others as well. And experience tells me that this Objective world actually
exists when others confirm this existence through our mutual and harmonious interaction
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Husserl writes, “experience is not an opening through which a world, existing prior to all experience, shines
into a room of consciousness; it is not a mere taking of something alien to consciousness into consciousness.”
(Husserl, FTL, p.232 <206>)
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with the world.

At the same time, however, Husserl remarks here that the others are

similarly constituted as what they are, as they are, for me, in and by my consciousness. They
are other-subjects insofar as I constitute them as such, and, following what Husserl says in
Ideas I, beyond that they are nothing for me. 38 But such a theory seems to invite the problem
of solipsism in that it threatens to reduce all existence, including the existence of other
subjects, to intentional unities of a single solus ipse, namely, my own. Husserl must explain
why this is not the case.
To summarize, Husserl argues that nothing exists for me – not myself, my body, the
world, nor others – apart from my own consciousness. This seems to amount to little more
than the traditional solipsistic thesis: that nothing exists apart from my subjectivity.
According to Husserl:
nothing exists for me otherwise than by virtue of the actual and potential
performance of my own consciousness. Here the potential performance is the
certainty of ‘I can’ or ‘I could’…Whatever I encounter as an existing object
[Gegenstand] is something that…has received its whole being-sense
[Seinssinn] for me from my effective intentionality; not a shadow of that sense
remains excluded from my effective intentionality. 39
Everything that I experience as existing, regardless of the manner of existence in question,
receives its entire being-sense [Seinssinn] from my effective intentionality, of which it is a
constitutional achievement. This is not to say, however, that what I experience as external or
transcendent is in fact a part of me, any more than the chimeras of my imagination are a part
of me. Husserl stands-by the fact that, “Just as the reduced Ego is not a piece of the world,
so, conversely, neither the world nor any worldly Object is a piece of my Ego, to be found in
my conscious life as a really inherent part of it.” 40 The conditions of the possibility of
experience are a “part” of my ego, but it does not follow from this that the objects that I do
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In this infamous passage, Husserl writes, “the whole spatiotemporal world, which includes human being and
the human Ego as subordinate single realities is, according to its sense, a merely intentional being, thus one has
the merely secondary sense of a being for a consciousness. It is a being posited
by consciousness in its experiences which, of essential necessity, can be determined and intuited only as
something identical belonging to motivated multiplicities of appearences: beyond that it is nothing.” (Husserl,
Ideas I, p.112 <93>) He calls this type of existence secondary here, since it is only the transcendental ego that
exists absolutely or primarily, and thus the existence of everything constituted by consciousness is logically
secondary.
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actually experience are likewise a part of my ego. In the CM, Husserl attempts to explain
that the objects of consciousness are part of my concrete monad, but they are not inherent
parts of the transcendental ego. The objects of my consciousness are not identical to my
consciousness, despite the fact that consciousness is always consciousness of something and
that nothing exists apart from my consciousness of it.

As Bachelard notes, “In the

immanence of the ego, transcendencies retain their sense as transcendencies.” 41 Husserl’s
intention here is discover the innate a priori structures of constituting consciousness. These
actual and potential intentional structures must be systematically explicated, since they predelineate “what I am allowed, and what I am not allowed, to attribute to an
object…according to the constituting intentionality from which, as just now said, its whole
sense has originated.” 42 This is the move to transcendental philosophy, which is emphatically
not a metaphysical theory of being.
After the discovery of the phenomenological reduction, Husserl undertook a serious
rereading of Kant. 43 With his newly-found appreciation for Kant, Husserl recognized pure
phenomenology as belonging to the tradition of transcendental philosophy, and was able to
bring his philosophy “into dialogue with modern thinkers, ultimately recognizing them as his
‘precursors’ while also selecting them a posteriori as his teachers”. 44 Husserl explicitly
states that his theory of constitution builds upon the Kantian doctrine of synthesis. In his
Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, Husserl writes that intentional
constitution is nothing other than what Kant had called passive production in the ADeduction. 45 The intentional object becomes what it is or it receives its being-sense, through
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In a note from March 6, 1908, Husserl explicitly mentions his indebtedness to an “in-depth study of Kant’s
Critique of Pure Reason” during the winter of 1907/08. (Husserl, Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic
and Mathematics, p.499) According to Husserl, what was problematic in Kant’s system was “that he never
worked out the profound difference between pure psychology (solely on the basis of ‘internal experience’) and
transcendental phenomenology (on the basis of transcendental experience, which originates from
‘transcendental-phenomenological reduction’) and therefore did not work out the deepest sense of the
transcendental problem of ‘psychologism’.” (Husserl, FTL, p.257-258 <227-228>)
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Angela Ales Bello, “The Transcendental: Husserl and Kant,” in Analecta Husserliana CVIII (2011), p.229230.
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doctrine of the synthesis of productive imagination, above all in his transcendental deduction from the first
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. When Kant in his great work speaks of an analytic synthesis, he means
cognition deployed there in explicit forms of concepts and judgments, and this points back, for him, to a
productive synthesis. But, in our view, that is nothing other than what we call passive constitution, nothing
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my experience of it. The object, however, is nothing over and above that thing which is
constituted by consciousness in experience. For Husserl there is no thing existing apart from
the object of consciousness to which that object points or refers. The phenomena simply are
the “things-themselves,” and to ask what causes them would be both a mistaken use of the
notion of causality, which applies only to the relations between phenomena, and a
metaphysical question beyond the scope of phenomenology.
The critique of experience found in FTL §94 follows from the methods and insights
that Husserl develops in Ideas I. If we reflect on experience and suspend the thesis of the
natural attitude, it is not clear that the object of consciousness is a representation of some
other “real” object to which it refers. What we have is a presentification; something before
us. There is nothing in ordinary sense perception to support the metaphysical claim that what
we experience as external exists in-itself and is alien to and independent of my consciousness
of it. This is a corollary of Husserl’s principle of all principles: “that every originary
presentative intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything originarily (so to
speak, in its “personal” actuality) offered to us in “intuition” is to be accepted simply as what
it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there.” 46 The
thesis of the natural attitude is not given in experience, despite the fact that certain objects are
constituted as external and Objective. What are given to me in experience are phenomena.

other than the team-work (disclosable by our phenomenological method) of the constantly higher developing
intentionalities of passive consciousness in which an extremely multiform process of immanent and
transcendent sense-giving is carried out passively and is organized into encompassing formations of sense and
formations of being, as is the immanent unity of the stream of lived-experience, and with respect to
transcendence, the unity of the world with its universal forms. Since Kant was not in the position to recognize
the essence of passive production as intentional constitution, and could not yet see the actual task of making
systematically intelligible the essential necessities of the constitution of all object-like formations.” (Husserl,
Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, p.410)
It is no surprise, of course, that there would be similarities between Husserl’s FTL and parts of Kant’s CPR, as
the majority of the latter text falls under the title ‘Transcendental Logic’. Much of Part II of the FTL is modeled
on Kant’s definition of a transcendental logic: “[Transcendental logic], which should contain solely the rules
of the pure thought of an object, would exclude only those modes of knowledge which have empirical content.
It would also treat of the origin of the modes in which we know objects, in so far as that origin cannot be
attributed to the objects….The term ‘transcendental’, that is to say, signifies such knowledge as concerns the a
priori possibility of knowledge, or its a priori employment….[The science] which should determine the origin,
the scope, and the objective validity of such knowledge, would have to be called transcendental logic,
because…it concerns itself with the laws of understanding and of reason solely in so far as they relate a priori
to objects.” (Kant, CPR, [A55B80-A57/B82])
46
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The existence of mind-independent “real” objects to which these phenomena are supposedly
correlated is not. In the natural attitude we naïvely assume the existence of the “real” world,
but from the phenomenological standpoint one must bracket this assumption. In fact, Husserl
argues that the notion that experience is of things that are alien to consciousness is simply
nonsense. No objects exist for me apart from my experience of them, and existence beyond
existence for me is a nonsensical concept. Transcendental phenomenology presents us with a
constitutional theory of Sachverhalt or Sachen selbst – the things-themselves or the state-ofaffairs – but not of things-in-themselves. For Husserl, there are no things-in-themselves (at
least not in any traditional sense).

This is the heart of Husserl’s commitment to

transcendental idealism; an idealism that ought to be interpreted as an “epistemic” position,
not a metaphysical one. 47 In Husserl’s view, phenomenology is a transcendental theory of
knowledge, 48 and such a theory limits what we can legitimately claim as philosophers.
The epistemological interpretation of transcendental phenomenology that we find in
FTL is corroborated by Husserl’s earlier “logical” works as well. In an appendix to Husserl’s
Introduction to Logic and the Theory of Knowledge, Husserl gives both a concise statement
of his vision of transcendental phenomenology, and explicitly endorses the epistemological
reading of his work.

In this text from 1908, Husserl tells us that transcendental

phenomenology has nothing to do with a priori real ontology of any kind.
Transcendental phenomenology is phenomenology of the constituting
consciousness, and consequently not a single objective axiom (relating to
objects that are not consciousness) belongs in it…The epistemological interest,
the transcendental interest…the interest of transcendental phenomenology,
aims rather at consciousness as consciousness of objects. It aims only at
“phenomena”… 49
No one can question that, at least in the passage above, Husserl believes that the interest of
transcendental phenomenology is an epistemological one.

A transcendental theory of

knowledge is, for Husserl, first philosophy, and in attempting such a theory one must bracket
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Husserl suggests as much when he characterizes the critique of intentional structures as preliminary
“epistemological” work . (Husserl, FTL, p.221 <197>)
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all metaphysical presuppositions.50

Any mind-independent correlate which we might

speculate as lying behind the phenomena is excluded from the purview of transcendental
phenomenology. Failing to do so is what leads us to enigmas such as solipsism. The task of
transcendental phenomenology is to investigate the conditions of all possible cognition, that
is, to uncover universal subjective correlations between the constituting acts of intentional
consciousness, their objects, and their meaning. 51 It does so by interrogating and arguing
from the phenomena as given, taken as “transcendental clues”, to the conditions of the
possibility of their being cognized. 52 All this indicates that, unless one can establish a radical
change in Husserl’s conception of his project, the epistemological interpretation of
transcendental phenomenology ought to be the framework that we adopted. 53
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In the first two essays in Appendix B of Introduction to Logic and the Theory of Knowledge, Husserl argues
for this position in detail. He further argues that skepticism emerges precisely because traditional theories of
knowledge have been borne out of dogmatic metaphysical positions. By starting from a theory of the possibility
of knowledge, a theory of the possibility of all cognition in general, skepticism is shown to be an absurdity that
results from speculative metaphysics. Husserl insists that: “The task of theory of knowledge is not to refute
skepticism, but to put an end to the predicaments into which knowledge lands in reflecting on its own possibility
and to elucidate this possibility, the essence of knowledge and the correlations with the object belonging to it.
With that, the reasons that urge skepticism are, of course, eliminated.” (Husserl, Introduction to Logic and the
Theory of Knowledge, p.406)
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Husserl outlines his doctrine of transcendental clues, which is central to transcendental phenomenological
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around: How is such an existent given? How can it be given as the existent of a category of this kind? And, to
what extent is it at times imperfectly given? How does it arrive at full givenness, and to what extent is absolute
givenness an infinite task?” (Husserl, Introduction to Logic and the Theory of Knowledge, p.436)
53
Exactly how we understand Husserl’s transcendental idealism in light of the epistemological reading is not
something that scholars agree upon. James Hart characterizes Husserl’s position as follows: “Phenomenology’s
claim that being and display are inseparable and that there is no mind-independent thing in-itself as a subject for
philosophical reflection is not the absurd claim that knowing is making. Nor is it the claim that the to be (esse)
of the world is reducible to being perceived (percipi), or that the being of what is known is, as truly existing
being, dependent for its existence on the knowing’s display. Rather it merely claims tautologically that the
actual displaying by mind itself of actual being is a necessary condition for how being gets articulated by mind
or how being is manifest to mind. The common sense view that there are mind-independent entities is not
contradicted by transcendental phenomenology; it only asserts that if we are in a position to say something
about these entities, then we have displayed them, and their being is tied to their display.” (Hart, Who One Is,
Book I, p.5) If Hart is suggesting here that Husserl leaves open, even as a limiting concept, the possibility that
mind-independent things in-themselves exist, then he is confused. Husserl writes that this philosophy “leaves
no room for ‘metaphysical’ substructurings of a being behind the being intentionally constituting itself in actual
and possible achievements of consciousness, whether it be a matter of an in-itself of nature or an in-itself of
souls, in-itself of history, an in-itself of eidetic objectivities, and of ideal ones of whatever type.” (Husserl,
“Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy,” Southerwestern Journal of Philosophy 5:3, p.14) For a
more nuanced account of this issue, see Husserl’s “Esse und Percipi. Einheit und Mannigfaltigkeit. Immanentes
Sein und Transzendentes Sein. Das Immanente Sein und der ‚Fluss des Absoluten Bewusstseins‘,” Hua
XXXVI, pp.62-72.) However, Hart is correct in saying that Husserl’s view does not contradict the common
sense view; it makes sense of it.
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Returning now to the argument found in FTL §94, Husserl concludes that one could
not “come upon a transcendency that possibly had any sense other than that of an intentional
unity making its appearance in the subjectivity itself of consciousness.” 54 The point here
appears to be a trivial one, that anything we experience as transcendent is always an
intentional unity for some consciousness, and therefore transcendence is always related back
to cognizing subject. Put another way, Husserl finds that it is nonsense to say that a world
could exist without there being some I experiencing it. 55 Such a world of transcendent objects
is nothing for me. Husserl is not interested in using the absolute existence of the ego cogito
as a ground for proving the existence of the world as Descartes did. The existence of the real
world does not need to be proved.

Its existence is demonstrated by our harmonious

experience of it. What needs to be explained is the sense of this existence, and the conditions
that make experience and knowledge of such a world possible. According to Husserl, this
can be achieved only through thorough phenomenological self-explication, since it is my life
of consciousness by which “everything receives being-sense for me.” 56
While everything that I experience, including those objects that we experience as
transcendent, receive their entire being-sense from my consciousness, Husserl states in FTL
§95 that the external world is also the world “for us all.” 57 While the world is constituted by
us according to certain subjective forms, as an Objective world, it has “the categorial form,
‘once and for all truly existing’, not only for me but for everyone”. 58 Everything I experience
in space is experienced as part of an Objective world for all of us. These objects of outer
experience are also experienced as possible objects for others. Experience tells us that we
live in the same shared world, and that it is the one truly existing world. What makes the
external world an Objective world is that it is constituted in experience as being
intersubjective.

If we think of Kant’s A-Deduction here [A104, A110], then for the

transcendental idealist it is part of something being an external object that it be an object of
possible experience for others as well. External objects are constituted in experience as
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56
Husserl, FTL, p.236 <209>
57
Husserl, FTL, p.236 <209>
58
Husserl, FTL, p.236 <209>
63
55

inherently intersubjective. Intersubjectivity makes the harmonious coherence of Objects
possible, and to subsequently judge them to be “real”.
Intentional objects can refer to perspectives that are not explicitly manifest to the
experiencing subject. In this very strict sense, intentional objects, particularly objects of
outer sense, are “transcendent.” External objects are constituted in experience as having
aspects which I do not currently have direct access to, but that I might possibly come to have
such access to. For instance, when I look at my hand in front of me, I anticipate or expect the
other side of it, and when I turn it over, there it is. However, in the case of an optical
illusion, my anticipations fail to be fulfilled. But we must keep in mind that this does not
imply that the object I am conscious of is somehow mind independent. These objects only
exist for me insofar as they are constituted by my consciousness.
Husserl’s views on the Objectivity of the external world are bound up with his notion
of a community of monads. While his concept of individual transcendental egos as monads is
distinct from what Leibniz meant by the term, paragraph 57 of The Monadology helps us to
understand Husserl’s theory of the Objective world. Leibniz writes:
And as the same city looked at from different sides appears entirely different,
and is as if multiplied perspectively; so also it happens that, as a result of the
infinite multitude of simple substances, there are as it were so many different
universes, which are nevertheless only the perspectives of a single one,
according to the different points of view of each monad. 59
For Husserl, there is a single Objective world of experience: the “life-world” that everyone
experiences. This is the only world that exists, and it exists by virtue of the way in which it
is constituted in my consciousness, or in my monad. It is my world, in so far as it exists for
me, but I only have complete and unique ownership over one perspective among an infinite
number of perspectives of it. To quote Husserl:
World-experience, as constitutive, signifies, not just my quite private
experience, but community-experience: The world itself, according to its
sense, is the one identical world, to which all of us necessarily have
experiential access, and about which all of us by ‘exchanging’ our experiences
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– that is, by making them common - , can reach a common understanding; just
as ‘Objective’ legitimation depends on mutual assent and its criticism. 60
When Husserl talks of “private experience” here, he means my inner experience of
something as external, my unique perspective of the world, not my inner experience of
something inner. The latter, while part of my world, is not part of the public world. The
public world is the one identical world in which we all have, at least in principal, experiential
access to, and which we can have in common. This is not to say that there is an external
world existing in-itself that we mutually experience. The claim is only that the external
world is constituted as being common to other cognizing subjects. Needless to say, this is
not an unproblematic position. There is also a claim here that Objective knowledge/truth
arises through an ‘exchange’ of experience. 61 However, Husserl does little in FTL to address
the concerns that are sure to arise regarding this view of the shared external world. He leaves
these problems for the CM and Crisis.
While it is intersubjectivity that “functions as sense-constituting for the Objective
world,” 62 the Objective world is also my world, and the primitive intentional basis for the
world is my primordial transcendental ego [Ur-Ich]. This “I am”, according to Husserl, is the
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Levinas relates the problem of intersubjectivity and the objective world to the notion of objective truth more
generally: “It is the essence of objective truth to be truth for everyone; this intersubjective world is thus ideally
presupposed in the very essence of truth.” (Levinas, “On Ideas”, in Discovering Existence with Husserl, p.30)
In a supplementary text to the English edition of the Passive Synthesis lectures (the text was first published as
Text Nr.14 in Hua XIV, p.305-308), Husserl discusses his notion of “Objective” truth as intersubjective, or, as
he states here, as “universally subjective.” The notion of intersubjective truth seems problematic, since, “After
the phenomenological reduction…the ego can be solipsistic in a certain sense, namely, insofar as there is said to
be no essential necessity that the ego encounter other human-beings and animals.” (Husserl, Passive Synthesis,
p.647) However, Husserl argues that all that is necessary in order to account for intersubjective truth is “an
open unending multiplicity of possible pure egos…which stand to me in a possible relation of empathy.”
(Husserl, Passive Synthesis, p.648) The argument goes that ordinary outer intuition allows for the possibility of
experiencing other human-beings and animals as objects in the world. Empathy allows for the further
possibility of experiencing/constituting such objects as other lived-bodies. Standing in relation to my ego is,
“an open unending multiplicity of other egos as alien to it, but as standing to it in relationships of empathy an in
I-you relationships, in relationships of communicative interaction, reciprocal-ego-determination. Likewise,
when I do not carry out the eidetic reduction, I not only pronounce my “I am”, but rather, exercising the
phenomenological reduction with respect to the factual givenness of alien human-beings, and carrying out
phenomenological legitimation by indicating phenomenological emperia, I know myself as pure ego and in
addition am empirically certain (in the phenomenological field) of co-being and communicative solidarity with
other pure egos. But I also therefore recognize that every truth into which I have insight is intersubjectively
valid: It is valid above the empirical, namely, it is not merely dependent upon my empirical ego. It remains if I
were to modify myself in thought into a randomly altered ego. But it also holds if I take as a basis any random
alien pure ego (that is found in every empirical ego). (Husserl, Passive Synthesis, p.648) Here Husserl also
suggests that the alter ego is me myself with an altered perspective.
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necessary ground of all cognition, of all that exists for me. Everything receives its beingsense from me, from my experience of it. This echoes Schopenhauer’s characterization of
the ego: “The subject is the seat of all cognition but is itself not cognized by anything.
Accordingly it is the support for the world and always presupposed as the general condition
of all appearances, of all objects: whatever exists, exists only for the subject.” 63 “Whether
convenient or inconvenient,” Husserl writes, “and even though…it may sound monstrous to
me,” the ego is the primitive intentional basis for anything and everything of which I am
conscious of as something existent in any sense.
For children in philosophy, [that ‘I am’ is the primitive intentional basis for
the world] may be the dark corner haunted by the specters of solipsism and,
perhaps, of psychologism, of relativism. The true philosopher, instead of
running away, will prefer to fill the dark corner with light. 64
The subsequent sections of FTL set out to provide the reader with the ability to illuminate
these dark corners, and to show that the specter of solipsism is nothing more than an illusion.
To recap, Husserl has argued that experience tells me that the “external world” is
made up of physical things, is transcendent of me, and is an Objective, shared world. It
would be groundless speculation to assert that the transcendent being of the world is anything
more than the result of the way in which the “external world” is constituted by
consciousness. Transcendent objects also carry with them the sense that they are objects of
possible experience for subjects other than me. A transcendent thing is not capable of being
completely given in experience. Such givenness is only possible in the case of something
that is a genuine part of consciousness. Of transcendencies, of the Objective world, I have
only one perspective of a seemingly infinite number of possible perspectives.

In his

summary review of the Husserliana volume on transcendental idealism, Thane Naberhaus
writes:
Paradoxically, then, the transcendence of the thing, its independence from
consciousness, in the end rests on its necessary manner of givenness to
consciousness, i.e., on its dependence on consciousness. For it belongs to the
essence of transcendent things that they appear, that they ‘‘are only and can
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only be given in appearances’’ (33). In short, ‘‘the being of the thing is not an
act and is not a piece of consciousness, and yet it is only something that is
given and logically justified (logisch zu Begründendes) through perception
and experience’’ (37). Expressed in Kantian terms: the transcendent, worldly
thing is empirically real but transcendentally ideal. 65
For Husserl, the transcendent, Objective world is an intersubjective world, but also one that
receives its entire being-sense from my lived consciousness of it.

2.5 The World for “Everyone” and our Secondary Experience of Others
Building on the results of the preceding sections, Husserl sets out in FTL §96 to address the
problem of solipsism. In doing so, he distinguishes two worries. First, there is the problem
of explaining the existence of an Objective external world. The solution to this problem has
already been given, although it might seem to reinforce some sort of epistemological or
transcendental solipsism rather than overcome it. Second, he must explain the existence of
other subjects, for without other subjects there is no Objective world for everyone, but only a
world for a solus ipse.

In a note added to the CM, Husserl himself insists that,

“transcendental others, as constituted in me, are fundamental to further constitutive functions.
Their acceptedness by me, their showing themselves to me, subject to correction, is in
continual synthetic connexus with everything else constituted, or in the course of being
constituted, in me.” 66 Again we run into an apparent problem, since Husserl has argued that
everything, including others, receives its entire being-sense from me.

If every existent

receives its entire being-sense from my effective intentionality, including others, what does
he mean by the “others”?
In the CM, Husserl not only characterizes phenomenology as a transcendental theory
of knowledge and as transcendental idealism, but as a philosophy that begins from
“transcendental solipsism.” 67

However, he aims to show that phenomenology does not

remain solipsistic. To do so, Husserl recognizes that he needs to provide a sufficient answer
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to the following question: “what about other egos, who surely are not a mere intending and
intended in me, merely synthetic unities of possible verification in me, but, according to their
sense, precisely others?” 68 Husserl calls the assumption that other subjects are more than
synthetic unities of my conscious experience into question in FTL §96 when he writes that, in
my ego, “every other ego receives sense and acceptance as an other ego.” 69 To exist as an
other ego is to be experienced as an other ego by me, or to be constituted as such within the
horizon of my transcendental subjectivity. Husserl continues:
Someone “else”, others – these have an original relation to me who experience
them and am conscious of them in other manners. – With everything naturally
that belongs to their sense (their sense for me): Such as that someone else is
here “facing me”, bodily and with his own life, and has me now, in like
fashion, as his vis-à-vis; that I – with my whole life, with all my modes of
consciousness and all my accepted objects – am alter ego for him, as he is for
me; and, in like fashion, everyone else for everyone else; so that “everyone”
receives its sense; and, in like fashion, we and I (as “one among others”) as
included in “everyone.” 70
Here, Husserl attempts to flesh out the sense of the word “everyone” that he introduced in
connection with Objectivity in the previous section. The Objective world for everyone
receives its sense insofar as it is constituted and accepted by me as the world for everyone. 71
But “everyone” includes all the others, that is to say, every other possible subjectivity like
myself. It also includes myself, insofar as I could be experienced by an other as other. I am
constituted for them, by them in their respective consciousness as existing as a psychophysical being like themselves. This completes the sense of “everyone” such that I myself
am included in it. Just as in the case of Objectivity, Husserl does not argue for “others” in
the sense that the realist wants. Instead, he attempts to uncover the meaning of “others”
phenomenologically.
Husserl continues by repeating that within the sphere of my subjectivity, I find myself
as a psychophysical unity of a body and a subject. I also find related to this unity others,
psychophysical entities other than me who are “constituted in multiplicities belonging to my
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intentional life.” 72 But there are many difficulties here, not just concerning others, but
concerning myself. To begin with, in my consciousness the entire world is constituted as an
intentional unity, and this includes myself as a subject in the world. This implies that:
I, the constituting Ego [Ich], am not identical with the Ego [Ich] that is already
worldly, not identical with myself as a psychophysical reality; and my psychic
life [seelisches], the psychophysical and worldly life of consciousness
[Bewußtseinsleben], is not identical with my transcendental ego [Ego], in
which the world, with everything physical and psychic that belongs to it, is
constituted for me. 73
Husserl insists that we distinguish between the pure ego that precedes and constitutes the
world from the human psyche which is in the world. However, Husserl realizes that this
splitting of the ego is not an easy concept to grasp, calling it the “paradox of subjectivity” at
Crisis.74
The paradox of subjectivity is perhaps even more worrisome in the case of other
subjects.

If an “other” is constituted in my intentional life, then not only her bodily

organism, but her psychic life, “as ‘another’s’ psychic life [‘fremdes’ Seelenleben]” 75 points
back originally to me. How then, Husserl asks, are we to understand her sense as someone
other? Husserl writes that it is:
a downright enigma, how, in the ego, an other psychophysical Ego with an
other psyche can be constituted; since his sense as other involves the essential
impossibility of my experiencing his own essential psychic contents with
actual originality, as I do my own. Essentially, therefore, the constitution of
others must be different from that of my own psychophysical Ego. 76
Husserl must give an account of how we constitute others, and how it is that we necessarily
ascribe to someone else their own unique mental life that in which they constitute not only an
analogous world of external experience, but the same, shared world of experience considered
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from an alternate perspective. 77

However, nowhere here is there any mention of

demonstrating the existence in-themselves of other egos.
According to Husserl, a proper understanding of the transcendental nature of my pure
ego reveals that my psychophysical being is a “self-Objectivation” of my transcendental ego,
that is, the object that emerges when I reflect upon my cogitations and make myself an object
for myself. This object is a unity of a bodily organism and a subjectivity, which, taken as a
human psyche, is a worldly object as well. Husserl asserts then that, by analogy, if another
psyche exists, it too points back to a unique transcendental ego of which it is a selfObjectification. If other lived-bodies are psychophysical human beings like myself, then
they would have their own transcendental egos that are alien to me just as mine is alien to
them. Their psyche would stand in a primary relation not to my transcendental ego, but to
another transcendental ego. This transcendental ego would be the one that someone else
would discover through her own phenomenological reduction to be the ultimate basis for the
constitution of the world for her and her life therein. “Consequently,” Husserl writes,
the problem of others takes on the following form: To understand how my
transcendental ego, the primitive basis for everything that I accept as existent,
can constitute within himself another transcendental ego, and then too an open
plurality of such egos – “other” egos, absolutely inaccessible to my ego in
their original being, and yet cognizable (for me) as existing and as being thus
and so. 78
The challenge for Husserl is not to show that other subjects exist in-themselves, but to
explain the sense of an open plurality of actual other subjects who co-constitute the world
with me, and to argue for the conditions of the experience of these other subjects. The
problem of others is thus the problem of understanding the notion of a “community of
monads.” The solution to this problem is explaining what it means to constitute an alien
transcendental ego in my consciousness.
The world is constituted for me as Objective, as being there for everyone including
myself, showing itself to be an “intersubjective cognitive community.” But this Objective
world is constituted at a higher level than the fundamental level of my transcendental
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subjectivity. The lowest level of experience is my inner world, which is my “intrinsically
first Nature”. Here experience takes place in subjective time and space, where the objects of
my outer sense are mine and mine alone; it is the realm of private experience, of a solus ipse.
This first world of is not intersubjective, and is constituted in my ego as my own, since it
includes nothing beyond my original experiences, over which I have absolute ownership.
Within this realm there must exist the germ for the constitution of an Objective world, for we
constitute the world of outer sense as Objective, that is, for everyone or for others. He states:
[this] sphere of my transcendental ego’s primordial owness, must contain the
motivational foundation for the constitution of those transcendencies, that are
genuine, that go beyond it, and originate first of all as “others” (other
psychophysical beings and other transcendental egos) 79
This motivational foundation is the condition of the possibility of experiences that are not my
own.
Up until now we have ignored a remark that Husserl makes in FTL §94 amidst his
argument regarding the Objectivity of physical things. Whatever I encounter as an existent
(for me) receives its Seinssinn, its being what it is, as it is, from my effective intentionality
[leistenden Intentionalität]. My intentionality provides or affords the Seinssinn of the object.
Husserl called this “sense-bestowal” in Ideas I §55. 80 But an other is not given in immediate
experience in the same way as external bodies. To be sure, we do experience other livingbodies or other psycho-physical beings, that is to say, we do experience some things as being
lived-bodies or other psycho-physical beings. While I experience my own body as a livedbody, the way in which I experience myself and my body is different from how I experience
that of an other. Husserl writes:
Of my self I have experience in primary originality; of others, of their mentallives [Seelenleben] in a secondary fashion, where the alien [fremde] is in
principle not accessible to me in direct perception [Wahrnehmung]. 81
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According to Husserl, I have experience of the mental-lives of others in a secondary way
because their mental-life (which would point back to their own unique transcendental ego) is
not accessible to me in direct perception. This means that the mental-life of another is never
directly of immediately grasped in my experience. At the same time, I do constitute certain
physical objects as lived bodies with their own mental-life that is hidden from me. Husserl
clearly thinks that we do experience other subjects, however, he does not tell us here what
this “secondary” experience we have of other subjects might be in FTL.
In an appendix to Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis §47 dealing with
the constitution of the Objective world, Husserl gives an argument similar to the one in FTL.
There he writes:
The animal, the human being, is experiencable as psychophysical unity only in
my lived-body/psychic inner experience; only I can experience my functioning
in my lived-body, and thereby my lived-body as lived-body, and in this way,
myself in this functional unity with this lived-body. I cannot perceive an alien
lived-body as lived-body, and I cannot experience an alien ego as functioning
in this lived-body – not genuinely. I experience alien subjectivity and human
beings in the world in the mode of ‘empathy’…The Objective world is the
psycho-physical world, and it is the cultural world that has received its cultural
predicates from functioning human subjectivity bestowing them, predicates
that possess their manner of experience and disclosure, but of such a manner
of experience and disclosure that it presupposes the Objective experience of
alien subjects… 82
What is important about the argument as Husserl presents it here is that he explicitly refers to
the secondary experience of someone else as experience in the mode of empathy. He also
mentions here that there is a cultural layer to the Objective world over and above the mere
experience of objects in space and time. This further aspect of intersubjective meaning that
we experience in the world will not concern us here, as it is not developed in FTL.
One might notice that the short passage on the nature of one’s cognition of the alien
ego from FTL also resembles the following lines from §1 of Ideas I. Husserl goes into some
detail here about the primary originality of the experience we have of external objects and of
ourselves versus the experience we have of others:
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We have originary experience of concrete physical things in “external
perception,” but no longer in memory or forward-regarding expectation; we
have originary experience of ourselves and of our states of consciousness in
so-called internal or self-perception; not, however, of others and of their
mental processes in “empathy.” As belonging to them, we “view the mental
processes of others” on the basis of the perception of their outward
manifestation in the organism. This empathic viewing is, more particularly, as
intuiting, a presentive act, although no longer an act that is presentive of
something originarily. The other and his psychical life are, to be sure, given in
consciousness as “themselves there” and in union with his organism; but they
are not, like the latter, given in consciousness as originary. 83
Again we see Husserl explicitly referencing empathy as a mode of intuition of the mental-life
of others. We do not directly perceive the mental-lives of other subjects, but we do constitute
other human subjects in experience as having mental-lives that are united to their physical
organism, while the content of these mental-lives is not itself given in experience. It is
somewhat striking that Husserl’s views on this issue seem to have undergone very few
changes in the time between Ideas I and FTL. However, it is odd that in FTL Husserl makes
no (explicit) reference to Einfühlung, or empathy, as the mode of our intuition of others. 84
We can use the passages from Ideas I and Passive Synthesis to help elucidate the
corresponding one from FTL. To grasp something in experience is to make it mine and to
constitute it with a particular being-sense. But the other, a genuine other, cannot be an object
of experience in this sense. Other lived physical bodies and the behaviors they exhibit
certainly are objects of experience. Furthermore, I constitute some bodies not simply as
being animated, but as having their own unique mental-life and corresponding transcendental
ego distinct from my own. Insofar as I experience them in such a manner one might say that
other subjects actually exist. But I do not, and cannot directly experience the mental-lives of
others, and they do not directly experience my mental-life. Concrete foreign mental-lives are
not possible objects of perception, even if I constitute certain objects as lived-bodies that
have such mental-lives. That is to say, the concrete content of such lives is never directly
experienced. 85

83

Husserl, Ideas I, p.6 <8>.
In fact, Husserl only mentions empathy in one other place in FTL. In §16a, he mentions empathy in the
context of how we understand the beliefs and judgements of others. (Husserl, FTL, p.59 <52>)
85
In Experience and Judgment §38, when explaining the extent to which he agrees with the Kantian thesis that
time is the form of sensibility in general, Husserl also argues that the objective world, the life-world, is the
73
84

It is strange that Husserl does not mention empathy explicitly in FTL §94 or 96, but it
is clear that this is what he has in mind given his reference to CM and GPP at the end of
§96, 86 and the emphasis placed on the role of empathy for the theory of intersubjectivity
throughout his mature works. In The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology,
Levinas writes that, “Einfühlung, which is an act which reveals the conscious life of others, is
a type of intuition different from sensible perception.” 87

Husserl briefly characterizes

empathy as “understanding and living another’s acts after him,” 88 and as the condition for
intersubjective experience in Ideas I, 89 promising a detailed analysis of empathetic intuition
and its corresponding evidence in Ideas II. 90
In Ideas II, Husserl tells us that in the sphere of original constitution, we are
originally given a multiplicity of objects in space and time, but we are also given “ζώα,
including men (“rational” living beings), not as amalgamations of what is given separately,
but as two-fold unities, unities which allow two strata to be distinguished therein, unities of
things and subjects, along with the subjects’ psychic life.” 91 However, the mental-lives of
other subjectivities are not primally present to us. The objects that we experience as external
to us, the objects of the Objective world are primally present to us as perspectives, and can be
given as primally present to all other subjects as we explained above. But my perspective on
these objects, is unique to my sphere of transcendental experience, and so too for everyone
else. Only the individual subject has original experience of its psychic life. Husserl writes:

intersubjective world for everyone. (Husserl, Experience and Judgment, p.164) There Husserl argues that it is
in empathy that “an objective, intersubjectively common time, in which everything individual in lived
experiences and temporal objectivities must be capable of being ordered, in constituted.” (Husserl, Experience
and Judgment, p.165) Empathy is doing the work that bridges the gap between my internal time consciousness,
between pure duration, and objective temporality. It makes possible the experience of an objective, shared
world; both of an intersubjective space and an intersubjective time.
86
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There are realities that cannot be given to several subjects in primal presence,
namely, animalia, for subjectivities are included in them. They are
Objectivities of a particular kind, given originally in such a way that they
presuppose primal presences, whereas they themselves cannot be given in
primal presence. Human beings as components of the external world are
originally given insofar as they are apprehended as unities of corporeal Bodies
and souls. The Bodies which are externally standing over and against me are
experienced by me in primal presence just like other things, whereas the
interiority of the psychic is experienced in appresence.
In my physical surrounding world I encounter Bodies, i.e., material things of
the same type as the material thing constituted in solipsistic experience, “my
Body”, and I apprehend them as Bodies, that is, I feel by empathy that in them
there is an Ego-subject, along with everything that pertains to it… 92
This passage gives further insight into Husserl’s notion of the secondary experience we have
of others mentioned in FTL. What I have in primary experience is another material thing that
I experience as another Body, i.e., as another lived-body. I therefore experience them as
having a mental life of their own, one that I presuppose to be similar to mine, but I
experience this subjectivity in a secondary fashion by way of empathy. What is more, I do
not and cannot experience the content of their mental life. I only experience them as having
a mental life, and empathy appears to be the condition for experiencing objects as having a
Seelenleben. Most importantly, if I did not constitute others in this way, then, according to
Husserl, I could not experience the actual Objective world.
Husserl writes that other psychophysical entities as constituted in experience point
back to a transcendental ego in a way similar to how my psyche does. I have privileged,
primary experience of myself, and this is what allows me to affirm the existence of my pure
ego. I lack this in the case of other subjects. In fact, as we have stated a number of times,
Husserl thinks that the mental lives of others are necessarily inaccessible to me. If they were
not, than the other would not be alien to me, and thus would not be genuinely other. At FTL
§102, Husserl repeats that:
other subjects, as transcendental, are not given, within the bounds of my ego,
in the manner in which my ego itself is given for me, in actually immediate
experience, and that at its first and fundamental level, the systematic structure
of a transcendental phenomenology is free to lay claim to other egos solely as
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parenthesized, as ‘phenomena’, and not yet as transcendental actualities.
Thus, at this fundamental level, a remarkable transcendental discipline arises
as the intrinsically first transcendental discipline, one that is actually
transcendental-solipsistic. 93
The world is constituted solipsistically, but it is not constituted as solipsistic. It is constituted
as an intersubjective, shared world. This world is shared by actually existing other subjects,
but here ‘actually’ does not designate their existence in-themselves.

It means that, by

empathy, I do experience other lived-bodies, other subjects. I also constitute objects in the
world not merely as spatio-temporal objects but as cultural-historical objects that are
dependent on others. Higher levels of phenomenological analysis are necessary in order to
fully explain this. But again, none of this constitutes a metaphysical argument for the
existence of other subjects in-themselves.

2.6 The Non-Ego
The Objective world is a world that I do not own like I do my inner, first world. It is the
world of possible experience, of experiences not yet actualized by me. While the external
world receives its entire being-sense from me, it is not constituted as my own. 94 Husserl ends
the discussion of other subjects in §96a by stating that the constitution of other subjects
makes possible the constitution of the Objective world in the sense of a “world of the nonEgo, of what is other than my Ego’s own.” 95 He continues:
All Objectivity, in this sense, is related back constitutionally to the first affair
that is other than my Ego’s own, the other-than-my-Ego’s-own in the form,
someone “else” – that is to say: the non-Ego in the form, “another Ego”. 96
Within my transcendental ego’s primordial sphere of ownness, there is a motivational
foundation for the constitution of genuine transcendencies, things that are “other” than me.

93

Husserl, FTL, p.270 <238>
In the ‘Fourth Meditation’ Husserl states that the ego constitutes within itself, “something ‘other’, something
‘Objective’, and thus constitutes everything without exception that ever has for him, in the Ego, existential
status as non-Ego.” (Husserl, CM, p.85 <118>)
95
Husserl, FTL, p.241 <213>
96
Husserl, FTL, p.241 <213>
76
94

This first arises in me in the form of another Ego, or an alter ego. However, Husserl does
little to explain this move in the FTL.
In the ‘Fifth Meditation,’ Husserl elaborates on this same point in greater detail. He
writes that, in connection with the constitution of egos that are not part of my concrete being:
there occurs a universal super-addition of sense to my primordial world,
whereby the latter becomes the appearance ‘of’ a determinate ‘Objective’
world, as the identical world for everyone, myself included. Accordingly the
intrinsically first other (the first ‘non-Ego’) is the other Ego. And the other
Ego makes constitutionally possible a new infinite domain of what is ‘other’:
an Objective Nature and a whole Objective world, to which all other Egos and
I myself belong. This constitution, arising on the basis of the ‘pure’ others
(the other Egos who as yet have no worldly sense), is essentially such that the
‘others’-for-me do not remain isolated; on the contrary, an Ego-community,
which includes me, becomes constituted (in my sphere of ownness, naturally)
as a community of Egos existing with each other and for each other ultimately
a community of monads, which, moreover, (in its communalized
intentionality) constitutes the one identical world. 97
It seems here that it is the pure possibility of there being other Egos and, therefore, of there
being something that does not belong to my sphere of primordial ownness, that makes it
possible to constitute a transcendent world.

Thus, within my own consciousness, the

possibility of an Objective world results from the possibility that there is an open, unending
multiplicity of other subjects, and thus an infinite number of possible perspectives, which
converge to co-constitute the same world. This argument appears to compliment Husserl’s
other assertions about the transcendental sense of the Objective world and of other subjects.
Here we see Husserl’s argument for the community of monads, each of whom constitutes the
entire Objective world, including others, within their own monad, but that each monad
constitutes the same world with all the others included within it. Perhaps this is why at FTL
§103, Husserl writes that:
every existent is relative to transcendental subjectivity. Transcendental
subjectivity alone, on the other hand, exists “in itself and for itself”; and it
exists, in itself and for itself, in a hierarchical order corresponding to the
constitution that leads to the different levels of transcendental
intersubjectivity. First of all, then, as ego I am absolutely existent in myself
and for myself. I exist for another existent, only in so far as it is someone else,
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another ego, himself a transcendental subjectivity - who, however, becomes
necessarily posited in me as the ego already existing beforehand for himself.
In a similar fashion, transcendental intersubjectivity (in the amplified sense),
which is constituted (in me, and hence relatively to me) as a plurality of
“egos” each of whom is legitimately accepted as intentionally related to the
same intersubjectivity along with me - this intersubjectivity, according to its
sense, also exists, mutatis mutandis, “in itself and for itself.” 98
I will leave the details of Husserl’s intersubjective monadology to be dealt with at a later
time.
The point of this argument regarding the non-Ego, as well as the ones pertaining to
the Objectivity of the world and the existence of other subjects, is to say that the problem of
solipsism as it applies to Husserl, both here and in his other writings, is not the problem of
demonstrating the existence in-themselves of other transcendental egos, even if the Objective
world has the categorial form of existing for everyone. In the first place, all objects of
cognition relate back to me myself as the constituting ego that precedes the being of the
transcendent world and of everything in it, including other subjects. The problem is, as
Husserl explicitly states, as follows:
To understand how my transcendental ego, the primitive basis for everything
that I accept as existent, can constitute within himself another transcendental
ego, and then too an open plurality of such egos – ‘other’ egos, absolutely
inaccessible to my ego in their original being, and yet cognizable (for me) as
existing and as being thus and so. 99
This is a constitutional or transcendental problem that phenomenology needs to explain, not a
metaphysical one.
2.7 Solipsism as a “Transcendental Illusion”
In FTL §96 Husserl claims that the transcendental phenomenological analysis of the
constitution of the Objective world is, at the same time, an attempt at dissolving:
the transcendental illusion that from the outset misleads, and usually paralyzes any attempt to
start a consistent transcendental philosophy: the illusion that such a philosophy must lead to
transcendental solipsism. If everything I can ever accept as existent is constituted in my ego,
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then everything that exists does indeed seem to be a mere moment of my own transcendental
being. 100

Stemming from the claim that everything that exists, including the external world and other
subjects, receives its entire being-sense and is constituted in my ego is the transcendental
illusion [transzendentalen Schein] of solipsism. Husserl’s choice of words here is worth
paying close attention to, as this is a clear reference to Kant. While Bachelard makes no
reference to transcendental illusion in her commentary on FTL, Lohmar does. He points to a
parallel passage from the CM:
The illusion of a solipsism is dissolved, even though the proposition that everything existing for
me must derive its existential sense exclusively from me myself, from my sphere of
consciousness retains its validity and fundamental importance.

Phenomenological

transcendental idealism has presented itself as a monadology, which…draws its content purely
from phenomenological explication of the transcendental experience laid open by
transcendental reduction, accordingly from the most originary evidence, wherein all
conceivable evidences must be grounded or from the most originary legitimacy, which is the
source of all legitimacies and, in particular, all legitimacies of knowledge. 101

In both texts cited, Husserl claims two things: 1) that solipsism is a transcendental illusion
resulting from the fundamental insight of transcendental idealism, and 2) that a
phenomenological explication of experience will ultimately dissolve this illusion. 102
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Lohmar himself writes: „Der Schein des Solipsismus, der jeder

transzendentalen Bewusstseinsphilosophie droht, die es mit dem Anfang im einzelnen Bewusstsein ernst meint,
löst sich somit in der Durchführung der intentionalen Analyse auf (vgl. Hua I,§ 62). Der Solipsismus bestände
in der Ansicht, dass, weil sich alles Seiende in meinem transzendentalen Ego konstituiert, all dieses Seiende ein
bloßes unselbstständiges Moment meines eigenen transzendentalen Bewusstseins wäre. Husserl nennt diese
Ansicht einen 'transzendentalen Schein' [248:20-29].

Die Auflösung dieses Scheins beginnt mit der

systematischen Aufklärung der Konstitutionsstufen des Anderen.“ (Lohmar, Edmund Husserls ‘Formale und
Transzendentale Logik’, p.179)
102

Eugen Fink talks about the “transcendental illusion” in his famous Kant-studien essay. See Eugen Fink,
“The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Philosophy,” in The
Phenomenology of Husserl: Selected Critical Readings, ed. RO Elveton, p.142-145. Fink describes this illusion
of a three-fold paradox, the details of which we will not discuss here.
79

Kant

presents

his

doctrine

of

transcendental

illusion

[transzendentalen

Schein/illusion] as the first section of the Transcendental dialectic, which is the second
division of his Transcendental Logic. 103

Transcendental illusions arise when we take

principles that apply to experience and extend them beyond the boundaries of possible
experience; when we take “a subjective necessity of a connection of our concepts…for an
objective necessity in the determination of things in themselves.” 104 According to Kant, these
sorts of illusions are responsible for many of the problems in traditional metaphysics,
namely, the hypostatization of ideas such as God, the soul, and the external world, and the
attempt to gain knowledge of a transcendent object by means of a transcendental principle.
Kant sought to expose such illusions, although, like sensory illusions, exposing them does
not make their appearance go away. Given that in the FTL Husserl is concerned with
distancing his transcendental idealism from speculative metaphysics, it is no wonder that he
references Kant’s doctrine of transcendental illusion, since this was the means by which Kant
set out to reject metaphysics.
Husserl’s claim is that the transcendental illusion of solipsism arises from the fact that
everything I experience, including the world for everyone and actual other subjects, receive
their entire being-sense from my effective intentionality and point back originarily to my
constituting consciousness.

This is a result of the intentionality of consciousness.

As

Levinas writes in Husserl’s defense:
Solipsism is neither an aberration nor a sophism; it is the very structure of
reason…The intentionality of consciousness allows me to distinguish the ego
from things, but it does not make solipsism disappear…[Reason] renders us
master of the external world but is incapable of discovering a peer for us
there…Reason is alone. And in this sense knowledge never encounters
anything truly other in the world. This is the profound truth of idealism. 105
In the case of other subjects, there is a certain epistemic solipsism, but one that is neither
surprising nor problematic. The illusion of a problem appears when we attempt to make the
inference from this transcendental principle to support some sort of metaphysical conclusion.
In particular, we arrive at solipsism when we take other subjects to be a kind of object that
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Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p.384-393, [A293/B249 – A309/B366]
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p.386 [A297/B354]
105
Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other, p.65-68. Translation modified.
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exist-in-themselves, and then conclude that no such objects can exist. In this case it is not
that we are led to hypostatize some metaphysical entity or to make some knowledge claim
about something that exists in-itself. Rather, the problem is that the transcendental principle
seems to annihilate transcendencies altogether, and assert only the existence of a single
transcendental ego. However, Husserl argues that this is incorrect, even if this conclusion is
natural and unavoidable based on our natural tendency to conceive the world in realist terms.
Husserl’s transcendental idealism does not annihilate transcendencies, it merely
attempts to clarify the possible sense of such entities. While it seems paradoxical that the
Objective world for everyone points back originally to my own constituting consciousness, to
a world that is for me, Husserl’s analysis is meant to show that there is no paradox here at all.
Whether or not Husserl is successful in dissolving this illusion depends on the strength of his
transcendental theories of Objectivity, intersubjectivity, and empathy, the latter two he leaves
to develop in the CM. But Husserl’s analysis of Objectivity, as presented in the FTL is meant
to give a general framework for resolving such issues, and to convey to the reader that while
phenomenological investigations may start from a transcendental solipsistic standpoint, that
phenomenology seems to result in metaphysical solipsism is only an illusion. Husserl ends
§96 by stating that: “We must rest content here with having made at least roughly
understandable the confusingly involved problems of intersubjectivity and worldly
Objectivity.” 106
Perhaps we can elucidate what Husserl means when he says that (metaphysical)
solipsism is a transcendental illusion. Husserl argues that possible other transcendental egos
are a necessary condition of the possibility of my experiencing an external world. I cannot
constitute an object in space and time without also constituting it as intersubjective, that is, as
being there for other cognizing subjects like myself.

There is no countersense in the

existence of other transcendental subjects, however, such subjects in-themselves are never
anything for me. Actual other subjects, whom I constitute in experience as other psychophysical objects but not as transcendental egos in-themselves, are necessary for my
experience of the actual Objective world. If these other actual subjects did not exist, and if
they were not possible other transcendental subjects with their own unique perspectives on
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Husserl, FTL, p.243 <215>
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